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Chapter One 
Introduction
As human rights values evolve within the international environment and permeate national societies, 
disparities in their implementation are disproportionately experienced by indigenous peoples.  50 
Indigenous peoples and their situations are unique “by reference to identities that pre-date 
historical encroachments by other groups and the ensuing histories that have challenged their 
cultural survival and self-determination as distinct peoples” (Anaya, 2004, p. 14).  As such, various 
international human rights doctrines, such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples and principles enshrined in human rights treaties recognize the need for their 
special consideration.  Yet as many states continue to deny indigenous peoples many of their rights, 
even though contrary to international norms, they undergo political, economical, and social 
marginalization, which leaves many indigenous peoples fighting for their survival.  Many indigenous 
peoples can identify with the need for self-determination, a restructuring of state policies on 
political representation, rights to territory and the resources present therein, and an end to 60 
discriminatory violence by police and military (Van Cott, 2000, p. 7).  Therefore, it is valuable to 
understand what kind of strategies will be most successful for indigenous peoples to assert these 
rights.   
Despite that within Latin America indigenousness is prominent in national identities, many 
communities continue to exist on the fringe of society and therefore have little to no representation 
regarding issues that directly affect them.    This is true for the Mapuche, a people indigenous to the 
region now known as Chile and Argentina.  In practice, successive Chilean governments have not 
prioritized the sustainable development of Mapuche communities, even though their living 
standards are far below the national average on all social indicators (Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 
2).  The Mapuche claim that Chilean policies, such as those regarding their ancestral lands without 70 
their free, prior and informed consent, threaten their identity as an indigenous people.  The 
Mapuche also blame their frequent subjection to state sponsored violence on pervasive racism in 
Chile.  
Many states wrestle with the evolution of the international system that increasingly grants 
opportunities for the ruled rather than the rulers (Cole, 2005, p. 473), the abandonment of 
Westphalian values and standards, and face pressure from the international society to accept and 
implement specific rights for indigenous peoples.  Chile, considered a stable and developed 
democracy in Latin America, has ascended to many international instruments on human rights and 
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has pledged to develop independent and effective national institutions to ensure compliance with 
human rights standards.  Yet despite these pledges, Mapuche in Chile continue to be treated as 80 
second-class citizens.  Rather than wait for Chile’s enlightenment, the Mapuche have been proactive 
in employing a series of evolving strategies to assert their rights in order to change their 
marginalized status within Chile.  Therefore, the aim is to discuss how the Mapuche have tried to 
improve their indigenous rights, to what extent they have succeeded and why.   
Through tracing previous Mapuche campaigns under different Chilean regimes historically, we can 
observe their shifting strategies and the rate of their success in realizing their indigenous rights.1  It is 
evident that Mapuche local and national approaches have had only limited success in this regard.  
Among the challenges faced by the Mapuche is the Chilean government’s unreceptiveness to protect 
indigenous rights, largely in part of Chile’s emphasis on its neo-liberal economic model and Chilean 
society’s views on indigenous peoples.  As international forums and mechanisms are developed for 90 
non-state actors to call states’ accountability to indigenous rights into question, many Mapuche 
activists prefer and continue to use local and national-level strategies, feeling that Chile is 
“responsive enough” (Kiel, 2011, p. 92).  This hesitation can also come from distrust of international 
instruments such as the United Nations because they are associated with prioritizing states’ interests 
and are susceptible to “neo-liberal [ideals], the dark side of globalization and the power of big 
transnationals” (Morrissey, 2011, p. 439).  Considering the questionability of Chile’s democratic 
values (Waldman, 2012, p. 65) and disingenuous or failing national mechanisms (Gallantine, 2008), it 
is clear that the emphasis on local and national approaches has not been sufficient to bring the 
change sought by the Mapuche. 
However, the evolving nature of the international system and human rights can offer many 100 
opportunities for the Mapuche.   The creation of new international forums and mechanisms allow 
the dynamic involvement of new actors, namely stakeholders, human rights advocates and 
defenders, to join discussions originally thought to be the exclusive domain of states.  By augmenting 
their national strategies by working via international human rights standards and mechanisms and 
its normative community, the Mapuche and other indigenous peoples are likely to experience better 
rates of success in improving their indigenous rights.   
                                                          
1
 Indigenous rights, as opposed to universal principles of human rights, give more emphasis to collective rights, 
including that of self-determination, for indigenous peoples (self-identified) because of historic injustices 
stemming from colonization, dispossession of their lands, territories, resources, etc. which have prevented 
them from developing according to their distinct needs and interests.  
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Structure 
The following section highlights the main issues in the discussion regarding indigenous rights, their 
evolution as an international issue, and why international approaches in upholding them can be 
more effective than local and national ones.  The last section in this chapter is a method of analysis, 110 
which lays out how this research will answer how the Mapuche have tried to improve their 
indigenous rights and to what extent have they succeeded and why.   
Chapters two and three are a historical analysis of Mapuche local and national approaches and an 
evaluation of their efficacies during the Allende regime (1970-1973) and Pinochet (1973-1990) 
regime respectively.  The Allende administration was marked by a new ideology towards Chile’s 
indigenous communities, and a political environment that encouraged land redistribution benefitting 
the Mapuche.  Mapuche strategies to reclaim ancestral lands ultimately resulted in policies to their 
advantage.  In contrast, the Pinochet dictatorship imposed a neo-economic model that effectively 
denied indigenous peoples’ their existence and their rights.  Mapuche strategies during this period 
were not effective in changing policies, but were crucial in strengthening their identity as a people.  120 
Chapter four also evaluates Mapuche local and national approaches, but in response to the four 
successive presidencies belonging to the left-wing Concertación coalition between 1990 and 2010.  
During this period of re-democratization, the Mapuche saw a continuation of major obstacles to 
their indigenous rights (Carter, 2010) despite Concertación presidents promoting respect for 
indigenous cultures and establishing national institutions to assist indigenous communities.  
However, strategies employed by some Mapuche activists during this period had sparked violent 
reactions from the state and resulted in a decrease of their rights. 
Chapter five instead focuses on Mapuche approaches that have included international actors and 
mechanisms during the Concertación presidencies, as well as the present Piñera presidency that 
belongs to a right-wing coalition.  When the Mapuche create strategic alliances resulting in 130 
international platforms for their movements, their concerns are brought to the international agenda, 
legitimizing their grievances.  Chapter six includes a summary of the research and conclusions about 
Mapuche strategies.  This chapter will also include potential implications of the Mapuche issue in 
Chile.  Appendices are located following the bibliography.   
Theoretical Framework 
The indigenous Mapuche people in Chile have been historically subject to policies that favor the 
development of an ethnic majority at the expense of their welfare.  In protecting their traditional 
lifestyles and their rights, the Mapuche have employed various strategies, including social protest 
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and the enlistment of the law and legal process, to change their disenfranchised status.  However, 
when the state politically or legally blocks agents of change, Mapuche activists and other 140 
transnational human rights organizations2 have numerous international mechanisms exist at their 
disposal to call for state accountability.  These mechanisms affirm the power of non-state actors to 
rise above the state to influence policy changes from an international platform through human 
rights principles “assaulting, challenging, besieging, undermining, busting, weakening, chipping away 
at, compromising, contradicting, breaking down, breaching, perforating, [and] eroding” (Donnelly, 
2004) the once state-centric international system. 
Realists and neo-realists disagree with the idea that the international regime should prioritize 
humanity and democracy rather than states’ monopolization of their sovereignty (Solana, 1998).  
The international regime should be a tool for enhancing states’ capacities to gain power, such as 
through facilitating power alliances rather than a place for non-state actors to call for adherence to 150 
human rights principles for the collective global interest.  For example, Mearsheimer suggests that 
the United Nations Security Council reflects the security interests of its permanent members rather 
than the collective global interest (1995, p. 82).  International institutions designed for cooperation 
are undermined by the desire for relative gains and opportunities for power maximization (Jackson 
& Sorensen, 1999, p. 131).  Therefore according to this understanding, the normative power of 
human rights values held by the international community or regime, could not alter or control state 
behavior. 
“If rules of sovereignty (mainly that states should respect the territorial integrity of other 
states) were to guide state behavior, why have these rules been broken repeatedly…[?]  
Stephen Krasner, for example, argues that although states sometimes seem to adapt to rules 160 
and do what is considered appropriate, they nonetheless seldom hesitate in violating those 
rules if this suits their security interests best.  For example, the United States, under 
President Bush Junior, defected from the Kyoto Agreement on greenhouse gas emissions 
because it was not willing to go against domestic industrial interests” (Kjaer, 2004, p. 82). 
This research assumes that the realist line of thinking regarding the international system is incorrect 
and affirms that non-state actors, such as transnational human rights organizations and the 
marginalized communities that they represent, working to change state behavior from an 
international platform would result in a system where “not only the existence of universal human 
                                                          
2
 Within the scope of this paper, ‘transnational human rights organizations’ pertain to organizations working in 
the promotion and protection of human rights and that focus resources and attention on the Mapuche people.  
These organizations are external actors, different from ‘Mapuche activists’ who have the same goals as 
organizations, but are comprised of ethnic Mapuche individuals or organizations run by them.   
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rights protected by states, but also the creation of a mandatory core of rights which individuals may 
claim, as well as duties vis-à-vis global institutions” (Kjaer, 2004, p. 93).   170 
Once all national channels for change are exhausted, the Mapuche’s partnership with transnational 
human rights organizations and their adoption of internationally-oriented strategies would comprise 
of demanding target states, Chile in this case, to improve policies negatively affecting indigenous 
peoples via international mechanisms or normative pressure.  This is contingent on the assumption 
that target states and their perceptions are susceptible to norm implementation applied by 
coordinated networks of transnational and international social relations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 3). 
Cole tests this assumption by studying what determines states’ commitments to ratify and 
implement international human rights treaties, which legally bind signatories to align their national 
policies with principles enshrined in the respective treaties.  He observed that states essentially work 
to balance the cost of ratifying such treaties in two ways; first, countries failing to honor treaty 180 
values and commitments risk damaging their reputations in international relations; second, treaties’ 
requirement to bring divergent policies and practices into conformity with treaty provisions will be 
costlier as discrepancies arise (Cole, 2005, p. 474).  Cole concluded that newly democratic countries 
express a largely symbolic commitment to human rights by ratifying human rights covenants, or at 
least those they determine to have weak enforcement mechanisms (2005, pp. 485,492).  Therefore, 
despite an initial lack of genuine commitment, international pressures stemming from normative 
beliefs do push states to change their behavior (at least nominally).  Therefore, human rights 
defenders, such as transnational human rights organizations, work to further promote specific 
normative values in calculated ways until there is the desired state behavior, such as addressing 
policies negatively impacting indigenous peoples, is achieved. 190 
“What distinguishes principled activists […] is the intensely self-conscious and self-reflective 
nature of their normative awareness.  No mere automatic ‘enactors’, these are people who 
seek to amplify the generative power of norms, broaden the scope of practices those norms 
engender, and sometimes even renegotiate or transform those norms themselves” (Keck & 
Sikkink, 1998, p. 35). 
Debate on Indigenous Rights 
While the words “all peoples have the right to self-determination” are present within many 
international treaties, states and indigenous peoples continue to debate on their meaning and 
implications.  The two most authoritative documents regarding indigenous rights are the 
International Labor Organization’s 1989 Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal 200 
Peoples in Independent Countries and the United Nations’ 2007 Declaration on the Rights of 
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Indigenous Peoples.  Broadly, both recognize that indigenous peoples have the collective right to 
self-determination and to maintain their distinct political, legal, economic, social, and cultural 
institutions.   
In practice, Anaya suggests that there are two general categories of self-determination sought by 
indigenous peoples, though each can have their own unique understanding based on their 
circumstances (Anaya, 1990, pp. 837-838).  The first category calls for nondiscrimination and equal 
treatment for a group of people within the national context.  The Khmer Krom for example, an 
indigenous people in Vietnam marginalized in favor of the Kinh ethnic majority, call for equal 
application of Vietnamese law and opportunity in the spirit of “peace, harmony, respect, 210 
understanding and cooperation between the Khmer Krom and others, including the Vietnamese 
people” (Khmer Kampuchea-Krom Federation, 2009).  The second category calls for degrees of 
separation or autonomy from the state that claims sovereignty over the peoples and territories 
inhabited by them.  For example, Abkhazia considers international recognition of their declaration of 
independence as a means to achieve “meaningful autonomy” for its people (Unrepresented Nations 
and Peoples Organization, 2008).  An assumption may be that states are more hostile to the second 
category of self-determination than the first.  However, states can be equally repressive to demands 
that fall in line with the first category of self-determination because of the slippery-slope belief that 
such rights can threaten their national and territorial integrity. 
“At the international level, both indigenous peoples and states arrive with opposing claims.  220 
Both national and internationally, indigenous peoples are increasingly focusing their 
struggles on the right to self-determination, principally over their lands and resources which 
continue to be threatened by international and national economic interests. […] Meanwhile, 
in contrast with the claims to self-determination continually being made by indigenous 
groups, nation states continue to employ policies of reconciliation and nation building as a 
peacemaking paradigm” (Cirkovic, 2007, p. 376). 
In Shehadi’s consideration of this debate, the clash between self-determination and sovereignty 
includes a “violent and destructive side to it in the realm of international law and interethnic 
relations” (1997, p. 148).  UN Secretary General U Thant stated in 1970, “As an international 
organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe will 230 
ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member State” (as quoted in Shehadi, 1997, p. 
140).  This goes in hand in hand with Lâm’s concern that states do not have the “material and 
ideological flexibility” to respond to claims of indigenousness (1992, p. 610).  The apprehension to 
indigenous issues on the basis that indigenous rights and self-determination principles may weaken 
national sovereignty was reflected during the lead-up to the United Nations Declaration on the 
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Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  Dissenting states Canada and New Zealand, joined by the United 
States, made clear their criticisms and worries regarding proposed principles in the defense of 
indigenous rights by calling them “confusing, unworkable, contradictory and deeply flawed” (United 
States joins Australia, 2007, p. 212).   
Normative Strategy 240 
Even when indigenous communities have exhausted all available recourse through national 
institutions, or are prevented and unable to use them to change policy negatively affecting them, 
there exists still methods to bring about behavior changes from governments.  There is where 
international forums can be used to exert pressure on states from the outside.  Transnational human 
rights organizations experienced in utilizing what Keck and Sikkink describe as the ‘boomerang’ 
strategy therefore partner with or work on behalf of these marginalized indigenous communities to 
draw attention to amplify their demands at the international level, often using organizations’ better 
resources and capacities (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). 
Authoritative and credible transnational human rights organizations are generally practiced in such 
strategies employable at the international level whereas indigenous activists or grassroots 250 
indigenous organizations are unlikely to be familiar these approaches.3  When indigenous activists, 
grassroots organizations, or communities reach out for assistance or partnerships with such 
transnational human rights organizations, they gain access to these methodologies, resources, and 
even extended networks.  Some of these strategies, identified by Keck and Sikkink include: 
(1) Information politics, or the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable 
information and move it to where it will have the most impact; (2) symbolic politics, or the 
ability to call upon symbols, actions, or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience 
that is frequently far away; (3) leverage politics, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to 
affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence; and 
(4) accountability politics, or the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously stated 260 
policies or principles (1998, p. 16). 
As previously noted, many states are apprehensive towards indigenous rights, mainly after 
considering the most extreme interpretation of ‘self-determination’ to be secession and an erosion 
                                                          
3
 Among the credible transnational human rights organization that advocate issues concerning the Mapuche 
are Amnesty International (AI), Minority Rights Group (MRG), Human Rights Watch (HRW), Unrepresented 
Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), and International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH).  These 
organizations work within the broader scopes of human rights as opposed to specifically focusing on gender, 
region, environment, etc. 
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to their sovereignty.  When states repress indigenous rights, indigenous peoples are refused 
ownership of or fair compensation for their ancestral lands, the ability to protect and practice their 
traditional lifestyle and beliefs, and are socially and economically marginalized, leaving them unable 
to participate as engaged citizens of their state.  Some state governments even go as far as denying 
recognition to indigenous peoples within their states so they are not held accountable to indigenous 
rights standards.4 
Therefore, transnational human rights organizations strategically know to reframe or repackage 270 
indigenous issues in a manner that is approachable and acceptable to targeted states and the 
international audience.  This has the effect of removing emphasis from indigenous rights to other 
rights, such as human, civil, environmental, etc., while still protecting the underlying principles. By 
avoiding discussions centered on contentious or complex issues such as indigenous rights or self-
determination, the focus is now on “complex interactions among actors, on the intersubjective 
construction of frames of meaning, and on the negotiation and malleability of identities and 
interests” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 4).  This reframing advantage is evident in Mamdani’s study of 
politics in labeling ethnic conflicts, where he found a consolidated, apolitical, and moral campaign 
was key in bringing support for action in Darfur (2007).  In another example, indigenous Ogoni leader 
Ken Saro-Wiwa recognized “what could be done by an environment group [in the developed world] 280 
to press demands on [the Nigerian] government and companies” (as quoted in Bob, 2002, p. 40).  
Therefore, following the advice of partner transnational human rights organizations, grievances over 
civil and political rights held by the indigenous Ogoni against the Nigerian government and Shell 
were reframed to appeal to environmental activists.  After attracting the support of influential 
environmental organizations (such as Greenpeace and the Sierra Club), their cause was advanced 
through international denouncement of the Nigerian dictatorship, boycotts against Shell, and 
improved Ogoni access to governments and media in Europe and North America (Bob, 2002, pp. 40-
41).  Other contexts can also include individual and collective rights to free expression, assembly, 
association, and religion.  The overall effect to reframing issues according to Shehadi is the reduction 
of “ammunition” that can be used by adversaries (state governments in this instance) because 290 
                                                          
4
 At the tenth session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2011, Raja Devasish 
Roy, a forum member from Bangladesh, noted that the Bangladesh’s government was one of the few in the 
world that “officially denied the existence of indigenous people within its borders.”  He was referring to 
separate statements from the Prime Minister and Law Minister of Bangladesh insisting that there were no 
indigenous people within Bangladesh.  See: Department of Public Information, News and Media Division New 
York (2011) Press Conference to Mark Close of Tenth Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.  Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2011/110527_Indigenous.doc.htm 
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alternative or reframed interpretations of self-determination no longer undermine the principle of 
state sovereignty (1997, p. 142). 
International Human Rights Mechanisms  
Another international strategy is the use of human rights mechanisms, such as those through the 
United Nations and other international institutions.  Both transnational human rights organizations 
and indigenous activists are welcome to participate in these mechanisms where they can bring 
issues to before international panels and committees, and often times to the immediate attention of 
state representatives, to whom they would have not reached had they gone through national 
mechanisms.   The two international mechanisms which will be discussed are the United Nations 
human rights treaties and the Universal Periodic Review.5 300 
The ratification of any of the nine human rights treaty bodies opens a state government to 
scheduled reviews of their implementation of treaty body provisions where party states submit 
regular reports to the treaty body’s monitoring committee.  Because stakeholders can submit 
additional information following a state report, many non-governmental organizations, including 
transnational human rights organizations and indigenous activist groups, take this opportunity to 
reinforce their position that the state is not fulfilling its obligations under the respective treaty body.  
During review sessions, these stakeholders also have opportunities to make interventions and lobby 
committee members to their perspectives of the state’s adherence of responsibilities to the 
respective treaty body.  While indigenous activists and organizations generally submit reports, 
without training or experience, some reports’ poor presentation detracts from what would 310 
otherwise be valuable first-hand experiences of negative policies towards indigenous peoples.6  
Access to resources through transnational human rights organizations, or collaborating with such 
organizations on reports and interventions, strengthens the credibility of indigenous peoples’ claims 
against states that largely present a positive picture regarding their responsibilities.  Following 
review sessions, treaty body committees issue their concluding observations that include 
recommendations and concerns which should be addressed before the next review cycle.  While a 
committee’s concluding observations do not have a binding effect, the treaty itself is legally binding.  
                                                          
5
 This section will focus on mechanisms for direct participation by stakeholders such as transnational human 
rights organizations and indigenous activists.  .   
6
 In 2008, a group called the Islamic Human Rights Commission (no relation to an official Iranian government 
body of the same name, though its relation to a UK group of the same name is unclear) submitted a one-page 
report to the Universal Periodic Review’s first session on the occasion of the Philippines’ review.  Despite the 
scale of situation between the Islamic Moro people, indigenous to southern Philippines and Mindanao, the 
report consisted of three short paragraphs lacking any credible sources.  The report can be retrieved here: 
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session1/PH/IHRC_PHL_UPR_S1_2008_IslamicHumanRightsC
ommission_uprsubmission.pdf   
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Therefore, as each committee is the most authoritative interpreter of the treaty in question, “a 
finding of a violation by a UN human rights treaty body may be understood as an indication of the 
State party being under legal obligation to remedy the situation” (as quoted in O’Flaherty, 2006, p. 320 
34).  These concluding observations can further be used by activists or other institutions.  For 
example, concluding observations from the Human Rights Committee (responsible for the 
monitoring the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) for Israel’s review in 1998 and 
2003 were used by the International Court of Justice to form an Advisory Opinion regarding 
construction practices within Palestinian Territory (O'Flaherty, 2006, p. 36). 
The Universal Periodic Review has a similar reporting structure and participation mechanism to 
those of the human rights treaty bodies where all United Nations members are put under broad 
review regarding the state of human rights within each country.  As such, there are no legally binding 
mechanisms within this exercise.  Yet its strength as an international mechanism for encouraging 
changes to state practices comes from the involvement of all United Nations members during each 330 
review.  This is to say that during each review, 192 member states are invited to pose questions, 
concerns, and recommendations to a state under review.  Information brought forward by 
stakeholders, like transnational human rights organizations and the indigenous activists and 
organizations they represent or are partnered with, can impact reviewers’ assessments of the state 
under review.  For states that are concerned with their international image and their position within 
a normative community, bringing to light infractions of human rights principles can have profound 
consequences. 
Chapter Two 
The Mapuche People & Background 
History & Marginalization 340 
The Mapuche people, whose name means ‘people of the land’ (mapu – land, che – people), are 
descendants of an Araucanian tribe that moved to the region now known as Chile and Argentina 
over 12,000 years ago.  Traditionally, the Mapuche lived in both settled and nomadic communities, 
and as hunters, shepherds, and farmers, living in small family groups under the authority of a lonko 
(a Mapuche chief).  All Mapuche social and political institutions are shaped by their spirituality, their 
religion, and the relationship between humanity and nature.  As such, their relation to the land is not 
measured by ‘ownership’ or ‘property’, but rather through the communal benefit of resources while 
maintaining balances with nature around them.   
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A century after struggling with Spanish conquistadors, the 1641 Treaty of Quilin recognized the 
independence of the Mapuche and their sovereign territory south of the Bío-Bío River 350 
(Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, 2008).  Following the founding of the 
independent Chilean republic in 1810, the Mapuche resistance continued to prevent subjugation 
until in 1852 and 1866, a series of land allotment acts unilaterally imposed Chilean rule over 
previously legally recognized Mapuche territory.  The violent military campaigns known as the 
‘Pacification of Araucanía” in the mid-nineteenth century furthered the Mapuche loss of ancestral 
lands in favor of Chilean landowners of European-descent and national and transnational 
corporations (Carter, 2010, p. 62). 
“The main consequence of military defeat for the Mapuche was the literal and figurative 
experience of ‘reduction’.  In a process lasting from 1883 to 1929, the Chilean state awarded 
thousands of land-grant titles to the scattered remnants of Mapuche society, frequently 360 
diving families and communities by forcing them to live on reducciones (reservations).  As a 
result, the Mapuche were subordinated, stigmatized, and forgotten, becoming progressively 
poorer and more disadvantaged in relation to the rest of Chilean society.  Their expanding 
population and decreasing space meant that many had no choice but to migrate to cities 
such as Concepción or Santiago, where they experienced the double stigma of being both 
poor and Indian” (Carter, 2010, p. 62). 
Despite adopting democratic values after openly disenfranchising indigenous peoples for centuries, 
successive Chilean governments continue to prioritize the exploitation of resources on indigenous 
lands at the expense of indigenous peoples’ traditional livelihoods and cultural identities.  The 
Mapuche claim projects such as dams, hydroelectric plants, mines, and forestry and fishing activities 370 
and all related negative environmental effects (such as pollution, dumping, contamination, etc.) and 
legal effects (such as forced relocation, lack of fair compensation, etc.) disproportionately affect 
indigenous communities.  Concretely, compared to non-indigenous populations, indigenous 
populations in Chile experience higher rates of poverty (35.6 percent versus 22.7 percent 
respectively), make half as much income compared to non-indigenous families, have lower school 
attendance rates (2.2 years less than average for non-indigenous children), low accessibility to basic 
infrastructure (41 percent of indigenous households have drains, 58 percent running water, and 65 
percent electricity), and high rates of infant mortality (exceeding 50 percent in some municipalities) 
(Stavenhagen, 2003, p. 16).   
As such, the basis of the Mapuche struggle rests on the recognition and respect of indigenous rights 380 
in Chile, especially in regards to land rights and control over their natural resources.   
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Mapuche Rights & Chile’s Obligations to Indigenous Peoples 
There have been varying degrees of political action to improve the Mapuche situation within Chilean 
modern history.  For example, the Allende administration’s reallocation of land greatly benefitted 
the Mapuche in the early 1970s.  In the early 1990s, the Aylwin administration passed laws creating 
national institutions dedicated to indigenous development.  While under Bachelet’s administration 
between 2006 and 2010, Chile ratified International Labor Organization Convention 169 on the 
Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, and also signed the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  Yet many indigenous communities found 
that these targeted national mechanisms were not independent or failed to uphold their mandates.  390 
Indigenous communities found that despite laws protecting their right to participate in discussions 
regarding the development of their ancestral lands and their resources (such as a 1994 
environmental law that allowed citizen commentary on proposed projects), government officials 
tended to “portray local communities’ objections as those of a minority that should yield to the 
interests of the nation” (Haughney, 2012, p. 7).   
In the face of discrepancies between the legal position of the Mapuche within Chile and their actual 
situation, Mapuche activism works towards four principle goals: (1) the constitutional recognition of 
indigenous peoples; (2) the right to protect and develop their traditional identity; (3) the protection 
of Mapuche ancestral lands and the resources therein; and (4) the end of policies and practices that 
endorse state-sponsored violence and discrimination against the Mapuche.  These four goals will 400 
discussed within the scope of Chile’s national and international obligations to indigenous rights and 
broader human rights. 
At the time of this writing, Chile’s constitution does not recognize indigenous peoples, though legally 
and in practice, indigenous peoples receive additional consideration and protection from the Chilean 
government on the basis of their indigenous nature.7  Yet constitutional recognition of indigenous 
peoples would oblige Chile to higher standards of indigenous rights as called for by international 
mechanisms.  While Chile has ratified both the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples and International Labor Organization Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples, there has been little political will to implement provisions in the legally-binding ILO 
convention and the principles in the non-legally binding declaration.  As policies prioritizing resource 410 
and land exploitation damage the ability of the Mapuche to enjoy their social rights, current Chilean 
                                                          
7
 While there are legal requirements for additional consideration and protection, many indigenous 
communities, independent human rights organizations, and even several United Nations committees have 
expressed concerns that they are not implemented in practice.   
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standards of recognition and protection for their ethnic and cultural diversity are meaningless.  Full 
constitutional recognition in this regard would offer the Mapuche and other indigenous 
communities due protection considering the nature of problems that they face collectively.  The 
other push for constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples comes as a defense from 
discriminatory attitudes within Chilean society that emphasizes the “civilizing influence of the 
[European] settler” (Carter, 2010, p. 62).  According to Waldman, because the majority of Chileans 
view their society as mono-cultural, Christian, western, and racially homogenous, the exclusion of 
Mapuche in the national scheme was inevitable (2012, p. 57).  As such, the recognition of the 
Mapuche as a separate people was rejected by the Chilean congress as it contradicted the national 420 
constitution which recognizes only the ‘Chilean’ people (Aylwin, 2006, p. 9).  Constitutional 
recognition of a multicultural or a plurinational state, like many other Latin American countries who 
have embraced the history and inheritance of pre-Hispanic peoples, would open paths to less 
discriminatory practices against indigenous peoples.   
As a result of long-standing discrimination against indigenous peoples in Chile, the Mapuche have 
felt their traditional identity and culture were under threat.  Because much stigmatization and 
discrimination are directed at indigenous peoples, many Mapuche feel compelled to conceal their 
ethnic identities. 
“Historically, the incorporation of Mapuche into economic, social and symbolic systems 
effected acculturation through mono-cultural and mono-lingual education. Migration to the 430 
cities accelerated processes of cultural loss.  In urban environments, infrastructure that 
permits a stronger presence of educational, health and consumer services has undermined 
the traditional authority of figures such as the lonkos [Mapuche chieftains] or the machi 
[Mapuche healers]. Likewise, better access to consumer goods has led to changes in 
Mapuche life styles. The contact with urban institutions and values has led some Mapuche 
to re-evaluate their world views” (Waldman, 2012, p. 66). 
Estimates suggest that only about twenty-two percent of Mapuche people are able to speak their 
traditional language, mapudugun, and few official institutions are involved in the dissemination of 
Mapuche language and culture (Morrissey, 2011, p. 2).  Damage to the Chilean environment and 
landscape from industrial projects also threatens the Mapuche culture and identity.  The gradual 440 
disappearance of indigenous plants has led to a decline in traditional medicine practices, exhausted 
water resources from industrial tree plantations prohibit traditional Mapuche communities to carry 
out their agrarian livelihoods, and flooding due to dams have removed access to religious and sacred 
locations to the Mapuche (International Federation for Human Rights, 2003, pp. 19-23).   
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These concerns about protecting Mapuche identity spill-over into the need to recognize Mapuche 
traditional lands because land for indigenous peoples, through their distinctive spiritual relationship 
is basic to their existence as such.  As Mapuche ancestral lands are rich in natural resources, 
successive Chilean governments have created policies encouraging private companies to exploit 
these resources, often without the free, informed and prior consent of affected communities or 
providing fair compensation as required by Chilean law and binding international agreements.8  450 
Mapuche communities also remark that they hold legal claims to lands being used by resource 
extraction companies based on ancestral occupation prior to the imposed reduction system during 
the post-Pacification era, land deeds entitling later them to specific land plots under the reduction 
system, and the fact that non-indigenous owners, especially in the 20th century, appropriated deeds 
to reduction plots through corrupt or non-transparent practices who later illegally sold ownership to 
private companies (Aylwin, 2006, p. 19).    
Finally, the recent practices of the Chilean government, including the disproportionate use of police 
force and discriminately applying terrorist charges to Mapuche activists under the Pinochet-era 
‘Anti-Terrorism’ law have drawn grave concerns from the international community.  As Mapuche 
communities and activists tried to draw attention to their cause, protest activities have varied from 460 
non-violent demonstrations (such as marches, rallies, and occupation of public buildings) to acts 
involving force (such as road blockades, occupation of disputed lands or properties, and sabotage of 
industrial machinery or equipment).  Yet due to the high presence of discrimination against 
indigenous peoples in Chile, legal and police responses have been disproportionately harsh and 
often failed to distinguish peaceful and legal protest from illegal actions that posed real threats to 
the public.   
“With some notable exceptions, Mapuche activists often face an unsympathetic and 
uncomprehending attitude from government officials, politicians, and the press. They are 
often seen as violent agitators who are opposed to the economic development of the 
country and advocate secession of the Araucanía from the state” (Human Rights Watch, 470 
2004, p. 16). 
The Anti-Terrorism law (Law 18.314) has been invoked exclusively on Mapuche activists since Chile’s 
re-democratization, where during the Pinochet dictatorship it was created to stifle political dissent 
against the regime by allowing prolonged pretrial detention, anonymous witnesses, and harsher 
sentences.  In its selective application on Mapuche activists, crimes such as the destruction of tree 
                                                          
8
 Chile has ratified human rights treaties, several of which protect the right of peoples to freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources and prohibit the deprivation of its own means of subsistence.  For more 
information, please see Table One on page 35. 
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plantations and industrial machinery are characterized as terrorism (Haughney, 2011, p. 11).   Its 
usage against the Mapuche, where other non-indigenous offenders responsible for homicide, rape, 
or other grave crimes enjoy more legal and civil guarantees than Mapuche defendants, and often 
receive lower sentences represents clear discriminatory treatment (Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 
23).  Furthermore, in search of ‘terrorists’, the Chilean government has deployed teams of heavily 480 
armed forces into rural Mapuche communities, often resulting in violence and fear-tactics against 
Mapuche families, including the elderly and children. 
The Chilean state and its emphasis on its neo-liberal economic models have prevented the full 
implementation of indigenous rights enshrined in national and international law.  The Mapuche have 
pointed to the relationship between their status as second-rate citizens and policies that in practice 
“exclude certain sectors regardless of undeniable economic success and democratic achievements.  
The Mapuche movement has shed light on critical issues such as the destruction of natural resources, 
the weakness of democracy, the lack of equal opportunities, social exclusion, respect for citizens’ 
human rights and, most of all, the political failure to adequately resolve the Mapuche conflict” 
(Waldman, 2012, p. 64). Chilean governments have also raised concerns about the potential 490 
secessionist nature of indigenous goals, as many Mapuche activists have called for self-
determination and increased autonomy over their ancestral domain and communities.  To this, 
Mapuche leader, Francisco Caquilpan, explains: 
“Our struggle has two directions, the defense of our territory and the change of a system.  
The Mapuche struggle to reconstruct themselves as a people, as a national society…  When 
we talk about the Mapuche struggle, we do not mean separatism.  We are part of this 
territory, but we are conscious that we need to construct a just, fraternal, plurinational, 
multicultural society, a democratic society” (Iñiguez, 2008).9 
Instead of waiting for the enlightenment of the Chilean state and society, the Mapuche have been 
actively working towards the recognition of their indigenous rights over the course of several 500 
political regimes.  Although Mapuche demands are the same in principle, approaches differ vastly, 
from land occupations, negotiating with the Chilean government, to demonstrations.  Generally, the 
Mapuche have prioritized local or national approaches as communities feel that the Chilean 
government is “responsive enough” (with the exception to the Pinochet regime) and thus do not 
                                                          
9
 All translations by the author will be accompanied by the original text. Excerpt from an interview with 
Francisco Caquilpan Lincuante, a Mapuche activist.  Original Spanish: Nuestra lucha tiene dos vertientes, la 
defensa de nuestro territorio y otra la del cambio del sistema. El Mapuche lucha por reconstruirse como pueblo, 
como sociedad nacional… Cuando hablamos de la lucha Mapuche no hablamos de separatismo. Somos parte 
de este territorio, pero somos conscientes de que necesitamos construir una sociedad justa, fraterna, 
plurinacional, multicultural, una sociedad democrática. 
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need help from the international community (Kiel, 2011, p. 92).  There is an apprehension towards 
using international institutions and even reaching out to large international human rights 
organizations.  The fact that it took approximately twenty years for the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to be approved convinced some Mapuche that the United 
Nations is more concerned about states rather than the protection of human rights (Morrissey, 2011, 
p. 439).  Transnational non-governmental organizations could similarly be inferred as having other 510 
priorities or answering to the state in which they are located.   
Method of Analysis 
In order to understand how the Mapuche have tried to improve their indigenous rights, to what 
extent have they succeeded and why, this research will trace Mapuche activist strategies in response 
to Chilean policies and determine their success in securing their indigenous rights.  Mapuche 
strategies will be characterized as being either local or national in nature, or having an international 
scope.  This research hypothesizes that Mapuche strategies that have an international scope, 
meaning that they encompass actors outside Chile, are more successful in asserting indigenous 
rights rather than locally or nationally focused strategies.   
The following chapter will discuss Mapuche local and national strategies in response to three distinct 520 
political regimes in Chilean modern history: Salvador Allende’s Marxist regime (1962-1973), the 
military dictatorship under Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990), and successive democratic governments 
under the five administrations belonging to the liberal Concertación coalition (1990-2010).  
Afterwards, Mapuche strategies that utilized international approaches will be discussed as they took 
place intermittently during the Concertación administrations and the current administration under 
Sebastián Piñera (2010-current) who belongs to a right-wing coalition.  In order to determine the 
comparative success between local/national and international strategies employed by the Mapuche, 
the outcome of these strategies will be weighed against the aforementioned four goals of Mapuche 
activism: 
(1) the constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples;  530 
(2) the right to protect and develop their traditional identity;  
(3) the protection of Mapuche ancestral lands and the resources therein; and  
(4) the end of policies and practices that endorse state-sponsored violence and 
discrimination against the Mapuche.   
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The realization of these goals is appropriate as an indicator of success because they are held in 
accordance with international indigenous rights standards and are in principle, enshrined in Chilean 
national law though poorly implemented.  Essentially, Mapuche activism for indigenous rights, 
especially in the context of these four goals, pushes Chile to adhere to its own laws and agreements.  
Where local and national strategies fail, external pressure from international platforms can 
encourage Chile to implement and uphold indigenous rights. 540 
Chapter Three 
Allende’s Marxist Regime 
The land reduction policies following the Pacification period left the Mapuche people 
disenfranchised minorities in their own land.  This situation was reinforced through practices of non-
indigenous landowners, after settling on lands confiscated from the Mapuche, often disregarded the 
official boundaries of reducciones (reservations) and incorporated prime reservation properties into 
that of their own.  Therefore, when Salvador Allende’s Popular Unity coalition came to power in 
1970 and focused on land redistribution, the Mapuche saw an opportunity to reclaim lost lands.  
Allende’s pro-Mapuche administration included influential individuals such as Chilean poet Pablo 
Neruda and sociologist Alejandro Lipschutz who championed Mapuche culture and their 550 
contributions to the greater Chilean identity and history.  Lipschultz, for example, denounced the 
idea that the Mapuche were biologically inferior and that their uniqueness came from their culture 
and language rather than their skin color or racially based claims of physical and intellectual 
limitations (Crow, 2007, pp. 325-326).   
Fighting Land Dispossession  
Despite the emphasis on addressing Mapuche concerns for land through its agrarian reform program, 
many Mapuche communities, dissatisfied with the rate of expropriations and the low level of 
genuine political representation, participated in illegal farm occupations and seizures.  Knowing that 
the government was reluctant to use the police against them, 694 illegal seizures took place within 
the first year of the program (Gall, 2002).  Allende saw these “almost necessarily” Mapuche actions 560 
as no surprise given the discrimination they faced (Crow, 2007, p. 332).  However, the rate of 
seizures, pushed forward with the assistance of radical and oftentimes militarized leftist groups, 
quickly outpaced the readiness of Mapuche families to properly use their new lands.  Not wanting to 
lose Mapuche political support, Allende’s government proceeded to expropriate many of the 
occupied farms and offered the new Mapuche owners a “generous dose of government help, 
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including technical advice, provision of tools and fertilizers, and tractors to replace oxen” (Carter, 
2010, p. 65).  Although the administration ultimately accelerated expropriations, at the same time it 
publicly condemned the land invasions because such actions could destabilize the political 
environment and invite attacks from the Right.  Allende appealed to the Mapuche communities in 
Temuco,  570 
“And I want to tell out Mapuche companions that they should completely end the tomas 
[land seizures], because they are exploited politically by the enemies of the People’s 
Government and they hamper a rational and technical application of the agrarian reform.  I 
want to tell you that the agrarian reform will be accelerated, that in this province of Cautín 
this accelerated process of land reform will begin by my own personal order.  And I have told 
my friend, Minister of Agriculture Jacques Chonchol, that he should establish himself in the 
province of Cautín for a period of one or two month if necessary, beginning on January 
[second], to set in motion an emergency path” (as quoted in Gall, 2002). 
In response to Mapuche frustrations, the Allende administration also passed Law 17.729, known as 
the Ley Indígena (Indigenous law) of 1972 that officially recognized Chile’s cultural and ethnic 580 
diversity and that indigenousness was linked to self-identification and adherence to a distinct culture 
and identity rather than a poor socio-economic status.  The Indigenous law also protected 
communal indigenous lands by prohibiting the further division of Mapuche lands without prior 
consent of the respective community (Aylwin, 2006, p. 6).  Law 17.729 also established the Institute 
of Indigenous Development (IDI) and its main objective of promoting indigenous peoples’ social, 
educational and cultural development in tandem with their beliefs and respect for their customs.   
Assessing Success & Implications 
The Allende administration lasted only three years before Pinochet’s military coup took power in 
1973, so long-term assessments of its policies towards Mapuche communities and the protect of 
their rights are not available.  Yet during this short period, the Mapuche’s usage of specific strategies 590 
led to concrete, even positive, changes in policies affecting them.   
As Mapuche communities saw that they could address their land issues with the leftist Popular Unity 
coalition, they became an important source of political support for the Allende administration.  
Taking advantage of their strategic position, the Mapuche sped up land restitution policies with land 
occupations and seizures and was able to participate in the drafting of the 1972 Indigenous law.  As 
such, improvements experienced by indigenous communities had origins with Mapuche responses 
to existing policies.   For example, via the 1972 Indigenous law, the Mapuche were able to obtain 
legal recognition of their indigenous character and identity.  The Institute of Indigenous 
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Development, created by this law, brought educational reform to improve accessibility by Mapuche 
students, and provided resources to develop and disseminate traditional Mapuche culture, history, 600 
and language (Crow, 2007).  Given the administration’s relationship with indigenous peoples, 
constitutional recognition would have only been a matter of time if not for the Allende 
administration’s lack thereof.  The Mapuche were also able to secure ownership and protection of 
their ancestral land via the sped-up implementation of land reform policies and the Indigenous law.  
The Agrarian Reform process ultimately resulted in the expropriation of 163 privately owned plots, 
totaling 152,000 hectares in favor of the Mapuche in two provinces (Aylwin, 2006, p. 6).  In regards 
to addressing discrimination against the Mapuche, Allende’s presentation of the drafted Indigenous 
law to the Chilean congress included a speech stressing that “the problems faced by Chile’s 
indigenous community were quite distinct to those faced by the rest of the peasantry.  For this 
reason […] Chile needed separate laws and institutions to address their specific needs” (Crow, 2007, 610 
p. 332). 
In this political environment where the Chilean government was receptive to Mapuche concerns, the 
usage of local and national strategies sufficed in improving policies or creating new ones to benefit 
Chilean Mapuche.  The success achieved through these strategies (although limited in its historical 
scope) set precedents for later Mapuche activism, especially during the Chilean re-democratization.   
Pinochet’s Military Dictatorship 
A military coup in 1973 headed by former Commander-in-Chief Augusto Pinochet overthrew 
Allende’s government and installed a military dictatorship known for its violent suppression of its 
political opponents that included “executions, disappearances, torture, and incarceration” 
(Waldman, 2012, p. 58).  The newly imposed economic neo-liberal model drastically affected 620 
indigenous communities by pushing economic development at the expense of their indigenous rights 
to their ancestral lands and identities.  The Mapuche saw a full reversal of their land gains, as well as 
the dismantling of educational reforms and assistance programs in their favor.  Only 16 percent of 
previously recovered lands remained in Mapuche hands (Carter, 2010, p. 67) and additional 
following decree laws 2568 and 2760 in 1978 and 1979, Mapuche ownership of indigenous lands 
was rescinded.  From the point of view of the Mapuche,  
“With the dictatorship begins the very negation of the existence of the Mapuche people, 
first in the sense that the constitution speaks of Chile as a country where we are all Chilean.  
And furthermore the [indigenous law 2568] also states that once the land has been 
measured and carved up, it is no longer indigenous, and neither are its occupants.  We are 630 
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completely left out.  Our existence as a people is denied straight away” (as quoted in Carter, 
2010, p. 68). 
These decree laws allowed division of land plots (reductions) which were collectively owned by 
Mapuche communities in favor of entitling plots to private enterprises, drastically reducing Mapuche 
access to land, now averaging only one hectare of land per person (Aylwin, 2006, p. 9).  As these 
plots were no longer considered indigenous lands by nature of their occupants, they were now 
subject to taxation.  At the same time, Mapuche lost support institutions and access to social and 
health services as resources were channeled towards private industries pursuing forestry, mining, 
fishing, and hydroelectric projects as a means to buildup Chile as an international economic player.   
For example, forestry businesses expanded into lands traditionally owned by Mapuche communities 640 
grew thanks to continued appropriations by the military government, often under the pretext that 
the lands were not fit for agricultural use (International Federation for Human Rights, 2003, p. 11). 
The Mapuche were also targets of repression as the Pinochet regime considered them political 
enemies and rekindled racist sentiments towards them.  Mapuche communities experienced 
coordinated police attacks and many Mapuche individuals and leaders were targeted for arbitrary 
detention where they were often tortured or executed (Urra, 1999, p. 86).   
“The Mapuche and peasants are driven by extremist groups… A result of this direction is 
their confrontational manner to outsiders.  At first glance they do not appear to own any 
weapons other than clubs.  There is no question that they use firearms, but they are 
concealed.  They threaten and intimidate strangers, they shout in their language and move 650 
as to surround intruders.  They are suspicious and do not abandon their stolen farms.  They 
fear, in practice irrationally, the prospect of their leaders getting arrested” (as quoted in 
Urra, 1999, pp. 90-91).10  
Surviving By Strengthening Identity 
Given the brutality of the military government, open political discussion or opposition was met with 
detention and likely with state-sanctioned violence.  As such, Mapuche activists were limited in their 
capacity to employ any strategy aimed at protecting indigenous rights.  Instead, local and national 
strategies were refocused within their communities as a means of survival.  However, a discussion 
on Pinochet’s policies and how they affected the Mapuche remains relevant because many of these 
                                                          
10
 Original Spanish: Los Mapuche y también los campesinos chilenos, están instruidos por dirigentes 
[extremistas]… Fruto de esta instrucción es la aparente cohesión del grupo ocupante para enfrentar a los 
visitantes.  En primera instancia parecen no poseer otras armas que bastones (…) No es un misterio que 
disponen de armas de fuego, pero las mantienen ocultas.  Se presentan amenazadores, tratan de amedrentar a 
los extraños, gritan en su lengua y algunos de sus movimientos llevan la intención de rodear a los intrusos.  Son 
desconfiados y no abandonan los fundos tomados; temen –el la practica sin razón- que algunos de sus 
dirigentes sean encarcelados.  
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policies, especially the emphasis on private sector development, have continued during Chile’s re-660 
democratization.  Their internal response to the Pinochet era ultimately shaped their activism 
strategies during into the new democratic period. 
During the dictatorship, rather than pressuring the government to deliver changes through protests 
and petitions (which were no longer viable options), communities worked to resist the state through 
a strengthened awareness of their Mapuche identity (Carter, 2010, p. 67).  This was important 
because as Pinochet famously declared in 1979 when unveiling the law that would deny collective 
land rights to indigenous communities, Ya no existen mapuches, porque todos somos Chilenos (There 
are no Mapuche because we are all Chilean), the Mapuche needed to ensure the survival of their 
distinct indigenous culture.  In response, Mapuche communities looked to traditional activities as a 
mechanism to cope emotionally and encourage social support systems: 670 
“The strength of the movement really came from the fact that the communities used their 
own cultural practices to rebuild solidarity and pride.  […]  It helped us get in touch with our 
roots, and we said it loud and clear: out culture gives us pride and self-esteem…  If the 
dictatorship had any positive effect, it was to reawaken our culture.  I think in times of great 
repression people look for ways to connect to each other and unify.  When the repression 
was greatest, the Mapuche movement was strongest: with militant revivals of our language, 
our traditions, our traditional organizations.  People respected the lonko [traditional chief or 
leader of a community] and the machi [traditional medicine woman]; they looked to the 
traditional leaders of the communities” (as quoted in Carter, 2010, pp. 67-68). 
Preparing for Democracy 680 
As political opposition to Pinochet grew in Chile towards the end of the dictatorship, the Mapuche 
sought allies to address their concerns.  In the 1980s, Mapuche activists tentatively took steps to 
advance their issues and often partnered with other civil society organizations while maintaining a 
‘safe distance’ from indigenous issues which would have attracted negative attention from the 
regime.  An early Mapuche organization, Ad Mapu for example, started as a legal organization under 
the umbrella of the Catholic Church in Chile.  Other partners provided assistance to Mapuche 
communities by offering workshops and helped drive local initiatives in agriculture, fishing, and rural 
development (Rodriguez & Carruthers, 2008, p. 4).   
In the lead-up to a plebiscite in 1988, the Mapuche forged a relationship with Contertación de 
Partidos por la Democracia, a coalition of left and moderate parties, and their candidate Patricio 690 
Aylwin who would eventually become president following Pinochet.  A signed agreement known as 
Nueva Imperial between Aylwin and indigenous communities promised political support for 
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Contertación in exchange for consideration of indigenous recognition in the constitution and the 
creation of a special commission for indigenous issues (Contesse, 2006, p. 142) 
Chapter Four 
Addressing Indigenous Concerns during Re-democratization  
Despite the shift to democracy in 1990, the economic model introduced by Pinochet, which opened 
Chile’s economy to international markets, encouraged foreign investment and exports, and 
prioritized natural resource exploitation, continued with the proliferation of large development 
projects that encroached on indigenous lands and rights (Aylwin, 2006). 700 
“[Chile’s redemocratization era] is characterized by progressive disillusionment with 
government promises, continuation of land usurpation, and the criminalization of protest.  
There have been speeches about inclusion of ethnic minorities, but no constitutional 
commitment to recognize the Mapuche as a people, let alone talk of any kind of 
multinational diversity within the political community” (as quoted in Carter, 2010, p. 71). 
Indigenous Law 19.253 & CONADI 
In accordance with the earlier Nueva Imperial agreements, Law 19.253, also known as the 1993 
Indigenous law, was passed and offered recognition of the Mapuche and seven other indigenous 
peoples as ‘ethnic groups and communities’ and called on the Chilean government to respect, 
protect, and promote the development of indigenous cultures, lands, and communities.  Specifically, 710 
Law 19.253 provided (1) recognition of the cultural value of land to indigenous communities and 
thus the need to protect it, (2) oversight of indigenous land rights by a body known as Corporacion 
Nacional de Desarollo Indigena (National Corporation for Indigenous Development) or CONADI, 
especially against ‘national interests’, and (3) a fund to assist the expansion of land and water for 
indigenous communities.11  CONADI’s mission to work with the state to benefit the development of 
indigenous individuals and communities, including promoting indigenous participation in national 
mechanisms, was originally welcomed as indigenous leaders were invited to co-manage the 
institution.   
Unfortunately CONADI failed to live up to expectations as it eventually was branded a weak 
institution susceptible to political pressure prioritizing neo-liberal economic policies over indigenous 720 
rights.  When Empresa Nacional de Energia (ENDESA) opted to build a hydroelectric dam in the Alto 
Bío Bío highlands in the early 1990s, the Pehuenche people, a Mapuche community, faced relocation 
                                                          
11
 Please see A. in the Appendices section for a detailed obligations contained within Law 19.253. 
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as the proposed Ralco dam would flood over three thousand hectares of forest, including their 
traditional homes and lands (Newbold, 2004, p. 179).  In order to move forward with the project, 
CONADI had to approve ENDESA’s obtainment of land titles from the Pehuenche, which according to 
the 1993 indigenous law, could not be forced to sell their land or be removed from it.  When 
CONADI would not authorize the land swaps, the new Concertación President Frei (inaugurated in 
1994) intervened and removed Ralco opponents from their CONADI offices, including two 
subsequent directors.  Frei’s installation of the third director, the first non-indigenous Chilean, 
ultimately secured authorization for relocations, the dam project, and the loss of trust from the 730 
indigenous community in Chile (Carruthers & Rodriguez, 2009, p. 748).   
CONADI was now refocused to “avoid political entanglement altogether […] and serve instead to 
facilitate a larger economic agenda of promoting market and entrepreneurial opportunities in 
indigenous communities” (Rodriguez & Carruthers, 2008, p. 9).  However, its redirected aim to 
purchase land for indigenous communities failed to address the context of Mapuche needs and 
demands.  For example, in 2004, 70 percent of CONADI’s budget went to land purchases while only 
20.75 percent of Mapuches lived in rural locations according to the 1992 national census (Newbold, 
2004, p. 181).  This model grew to be financially unsustainable as land prices rose.  In 1994, US $4.2 
million bought 7,036 hectares while in 2004; US $16.4 million bought a slightly higher amount of 
land, 7,629 hectares.  Additionally, CONADI’s procured lands were often of poor quality and failed to 740 
consider whether recipient families had financial or technical capacity to take advantage of the land 
(Aylwin, 2006, p. 16).  According to one CONADI official, 
“The Ministry of Finance pressed us to tell them about the economic return of such and such 
land devolution, when what we evaluated were the sociological and anthropological links 
between the community and a plot of land, the moral nature of the reparation…. In principle, 
it was the same to us if [the indigenous communities] got the land and did not do anything 
with it” (as quoted in Rodriguez & Carruthers, 2008, p. 11).   
ILO 169 & Constitutional Recognition 
The Nueva Imperial agreement also stipulated that the recognition of indigenous peoples must be a 
government priority.  This ambition was highlighted by the new International Labor Organization 750 
Convention 169 on Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ILO 169) in 1989.  Aylwin’s Law 19.253 
originally included a proposal for a constitutional amendment formally recognizing indigenous 
peoples in Chile, and the ratification of ILO 169, but this failed pass through Chilean congress at the 
time (Contesse, 2006, p. 143). 
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The Chilean government hesitates to recognize indigenous peoples as distinct ‘peoples’ as this 
challenges the notion of Chile as a unitary state and society.  Furthermore, Chilean congress 
envisioned legal repercussions to granting collective rights on the basis of an indigenous character as 
was required by ratification of ILO 169: 
“…We must reject the concept of a ‘people’ as having implications regarding rights under 
international law attached to the aforementioned term, as set forth in Article 1, Section 3, in 760 
the treaty under consideration… 
“[The above considerations regarding the treaty] and especially the terms in question used 
by Convention 169, is sufficient for this panel to reach the deep conviction that the term 
‘indigenous peoples’ thereof, should be considered as a group of people or groups of people 
from a country with common cultural characteristics, which do not endow them with public 
powers or the entitlement to participate or be consulted on matters affecting them, strictly 
adhering to the Supreme Law of the State as part of the population.  They do not constitute 
an autonomous collective amongst individuals and the State” (Tribunal Constitucional de 
Chile, 2000).12 
The Chilean government also considered that ILO 169 ratification would repel private businesses 770 
from doing business in Chile as they would be bound to protect indigenous rights regarding land 
(Ibarra, 2011, p. 110).  Ultimately, as the Chilean government believed that its own democratic 
model was sufficient to protect indigenous communities (such as through Law 19.253), there was no 
need to grant indigenous peoples distinct rights.  Rather than explicitly state that indigenous 
communities can carry on their traditions and culture, the constitutional affirmation that ‘Chile is a 
democratic republic’ is enough (Ibarra, 2011, p. 99).  However, the problem with this assumption is 
that the Mapuche people in Chile are effectively unable to “intervene in the process of social 
transformation” as legal and political dynamics allow the indigenous concerns to be “systematically 
disregarded” (Contesse, 2006, pp. 136, 149). 
President Lagos, the third president from Concertación inaugurated in 2000, launched the Comisión 780 
Verdad Histórica y Nuevo Trato (‘Historical Truth and New Deal Commission’) in 2001 to review the 
relationship between indigenous peoples and the state and to provide recommendations regarding 
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 Original Spanish: (…) debemos desestimar que el concepto ‘pueblo’, tenga implicación alguna en lo que atañe 
a los derechos que pueda conferirse a dicho término en el derecho internacional, ya que lo establece en esas 
mismas palabras el artículo 1º, N° 3, del tratado en estudio. And  (…) Que todo lo expuesto y, especialmente los 
propios términos de la Convención N° 169 cuestionada, es suficiente para que este Tribunal llegue a la íntima 
convicción que la expresión la expresión “pueblos indígenas”, debe ser considerada en el ámbito de dicho 
tratado, como un conjunto de personas o grupos de personas de un país que poseen en común características 
culturales propias, que no se encuentran dotadas de potestades publicas y que tienen y tendrán derecho a 
participar y a ser consultadas, en materias que les conciernan, con estricta sujeción a la Ley Suprema del 
respectivo Estado de cuya población forman parte. Ellos no constituyen un ente colectivo autónomo entre los 
individuos y el Estado; 
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the recognition of indigenous people as distinct (Aylwin, 2006, p. 17).  When the Commission 
delivered its findings in 2003 acknowledging the historic injustices experienced by indigenous 
peoples and urged congress and the president to pass legislation recognizing the constitutional 
rights of indigenous peoples, no government action was taken on these recommendations 
(Rodriguez & Carruthers, 2008, p. 14).  It was not until fourth Concertación President Bachelet (2006-
2010) that Chile ratified ILO 169 in 2008.13  However, as the Chilean government remained reluctant 
to grant constitutional recognition to indigenous peoples, congress removed this obligation after 
ratifying the convention by ruling that ILO 169 was non-binding (Carter, 2010, p. 73), especially since 790 
they believed ILO 169’s provisions were already protected by existing legislation (Perricone, 2010, p. 
101).  
Social Protest as Terrorism  
Despite legal rights enshrined in the 1993 Indigenous law and CONADI designed to enforce them, the 
Ralco incident demonstrated the continued vulnerability of indigenous rights despite the new era of 
democracy.  The Mapuche found they were unable to exert pressure on the government or on 
businesses, and without assistance as CONADI lacked the means to engage Mapuche communities in 
order to help them.  CONADI and the Chilean government quickly lost credibility regarding their 
sincerity to address indigenous issues.   
“CONADI lacks the institutional capacity to defend the interests of the Pehuenche 800 
communities.  Its single lawyer does not have a staff and receives a gasoline allowance of 
only 150 dollars for the entire fiscal year; his regional office is 300 km from Pehuenche 
territory. The Pehuenche do not have travel funds to meet with him.  CONADI has been 
ineffective in dealing with small conflicts and is already overwhelmed by the negotiations 
with ENDESA over the issue of land exchange in Ralco-Lepoy, which is only one part of  the 
overall resettlement planning problem” (as quoted in Skaevestad, 2008, p. 7). 
When CONADI, unsurprisingly to the Mapuche communities, failed again in 1997 to resolve land 
conflicts or recover ancestral land from Forestal Arauco, one of the largest forestry companies in 
Chile, many frustrated Mapuche families reactivated protest and land-seizure strategies from the 
1970s.  Grassroots Mapuche organizations often responded with peaceful mass protests, nonviolent 810 
land occupations, and continued legal assertions to their rights (Haughney, 2012, p. 4).  While some 
Mapuche activists use civil lawsuits, political roundtables, and negotiations to raise their concerns, 
the majority of Mapuche activists participate in social protests in the forms of marches and 
demonstrations to road blockades and acts of arson on plantations or machinery sabotage (Terwindt, 
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 Under Bachelet, Chile also ratified the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
2007.  This declaration is not legally binding. 
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2009, p. 239).  However, when a Mapuche group captured and set fire to three logging trucks in late 
1997, the Frei administration responded by arresting Mapuche activists and charging them with the 
same Anti-Terrorist & Internal Security Law that Pinochet created and used to silence his political 
opponents (Rodriguez & Carruthers, 2008, p. 10).   
This 1984 law was originally created in response to “kidnappings, assassinations, and attacks on 
police stations using assault rifle and rocket-propelled grenades” by doubling normal sentences, 820 
making pretrial release more difficult, and allowing the prosecution to withhold evidence from the 
defense for up to six month and to use anonymous witnesses (Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 3).  Yet 
even though Mapuche social protest does occasionally result in arson or damage to private property, 
“Mapuche activists have avoided attacking landowners or logging company workers, and when they 
use force, resort to slingshots and traditional wooden palin sticks to defend themselves when they 
are occupying land” (Haughney, 2011, p. 11).  While a small number of activists have engaged in 
more extreme forms of protests (estimated to be less than 3 percent), most Mapuche share their 
grievances (Richards, 2010, p. 68).  Therefore, as Mapuche crimes in this context do not qualify as 
terrorism, especially according to international standards such as the Inter-American Convention 
against terrorism (Richards, 2010, p. 74), the Chilean government’s application of the anti-terrorism 830 
law is seen as systematic discrimination.  One Mapuche activist noted, 
“The problem that we face is that we have no access to a fair justice system.  Mapuche who 
are arrested are immediately and inevitably condemned.  We have no right to the 
presumption of innocence before proven guilty.  There have been instances of violence 
attributed to the Mapuche community without having done any investigations.  This has 
been the norm for Concertación officials” (Iñiguez, 2008).14 
The Mapuche point to all levels of legal discrimination, such as in the 2002 case of two lonkos and a 
non-Mapuche activist charged with making terrorist threats and committing arson on property 
belonging to a former agricultural minister.  After their acquittal, the Chilean Supreme Court 
declared a mistrial in response to a petition from the plaintiffs, which included the state (Human 840 
Rights Watch, 2004, p. 38).  In 2004, when a lower-court judge ruled that the terrorist charges were 
inapplicable to five Mapuche activists accused of terrorist arson in association with fires set on a 
                                                          
14
 Excerpt from an interview with Francisco Caquilpan Lincuante, a Mapuche activist.  Original Spanish: El 
problema que enfrentamos es que no tenemos acceso a un juicio justo.  Mapuche que es encarcelado, mapuche 
que es condenado.  No tenemos derecho a la presunción de inocencia.  Se han dado casos donde se ha 
cometido un atentado y sin haber hecho investigación, prácticamente en menos de 24 horas se ha acusado a 
nuestra gente mapuche de haberlo cometido.  Esto es un practica normal de las autoridades del gobierno de la 
Concertación. 
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pine plantation owned by a logging company, she was removed from the case by the Supreme Court 
(Richards, 2010, p. 73).   
The Chilean government and society also perpetuate the notion of Mapuche as terrorists.  The 
Chilean media regularly presents situations with the Mapuche in terms of ‘rural terrorism’, ‘racial 
conflict’, and ‘spiral of violence’ (Skaevestad, 2008, pp. 4-5).  Some sensational news headlines 
promoted by conservative groups include: “‘Alert in Arauco, Fearing Wave of Mapuche Violence’, 
‘The Mapuche Intifada: The Indigenous Uprising Worsens’, ‘Mapuches Threaten’, and ‘Indigenous 
Communities on the War Path’” (Richards, 2010, p. 75).  This terrorist characterization helps to grant 850 
the state legitimacy in using violent force against the Mapuche.  Many Mapuche rural communities 
throughout Chile experience police violence and occupation by national military units.  Mapuche 
families connected to individuals arrested or under suspicion of crime report that police repeatedly 
raid their homes and make threats to their physical wellbeing.  Such police raids, they report, are 
characterized by excessive and disproportionate violence against family members, including women, 
children, and elderly Mapuche.  Their complaints later receive little consideration (Anaya, 2009, p. 
42).   
All Chilean governments since 2002 have invoked the anti-terrorism law or have authorized the use 
of force and harsher laws against Mapuche activists.15  Current President Piñera, who belongs to a 
right-wing coalition, is an outspoken supporter of the anti-terrorism law as has used it several times 860 
since his inauguration in 2010.  It was most recently used in December 2011 against a Mapuche 
group implicated in a wildfire that killed seven firefighters even before an official cause of the fire 
had been determined (Carlyle, 2012).  The harsh state response to Mapuche claims for their rights 
has caused a deep distrust toward the judiciary that the Mapuche perceive as discriminatory and 
racist.  Most attempts to go through legal avenues encompass multiple barriers to participation, 
such as language, financial, and Chilean legal culture only to end with higher court reversals of 
decisions favoring Mapuche defendants, especially in terrorism cases (Contesse, 2006, p. 149).   
Limitations of Local and National Strategies 
Though the Nueva Imperial agreement showed promise for Mapuche political influence, once 
Concertación was in power, it was highly unlikely that congress would support the constitutional 870 
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 During the Lagos administration alone, approximately 300 Mapuche from one region have been criminally 
tried for participation in “violent actions in the context of land conflicts involving their communities” where 10 
percent were prosecuted under the anti-terrorism law (Aylwin, 2006, p. 21).  Although during her campaign, 
Bachelet promised to no longer invoke the anti-terrorism law, her administration used it several times against 
Mapuche activists (Richards, 2010, p. 74). 
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recognition of indigenous peoples and ratify ILO 169 (Contesse, 2006, p. 143).  The political weight of 
the Mapuche vote again elicited campaign promises from Bachelet, who was herself a victim of 
repression under Pinochet (Haughney, 2012, p. 5). Though Bachelet’s administration was responsible 
for the ratification of ILO 169, it also recast the convention as non-binding in order to continue 
development projects that infringed on Mapuche collective rights.  Thus, the Mapuche strategy to 
participate in Chilean politics as a means to obtain recognition as a people has been unsuccessful, 
largely in part due to the lack of political will among Chileans.   
Many solutions offered by modern (in this context meaning post-Pinochet) administrations have 
been ineffective because they are often in direct conflict with Chile’s neoliberal model.  While on the 
surface acknowledging indigenous cultures and heritages in Chile and the need to assist indigenous 880 
communities in rising out of poverty, modern Chilean governments could not envision efforts 
outside simply incorporating them into the neoliberalized economy (Haughney, 2012, p. 6).  This 
contradiction was evident during the build-up to the construction of the Ralco dam.  CONADI, 
originally created to encourage the economic and cultural development of indigenous communities, 
ultimately played a part in supporting the expansion of global economy into indigenous lands 
without indigenous participation (Aylwin, 2006, p. 22).  Therefore, national mechanisms in order to 
secure indigenous peoples’ right to free, informed, and prior consent regarding policies affecting 
their ancestral land and their identities have failed. 
Attempts to protect indigenous rights through legal recourse have also been largely unsuccessful.  In 
some courts, indigenous laws are overruled by laws on electricity or water.  The conservative nature 890 
of the Chilean legal system also results in judges rarely applying international human rights 
standards to their decisions (Skaevestad, 2008, p. 19).  The Mapuche have also seen political 
agendas at play when high courts take action to ensure the application and prosecution of Mapuche 
‘political prisoners’ under the anti-terrorist law.  Therefore, many Mapuche communities see social 
protest as the only approach to assert their indigenous rights. 
 “The only way for communities to be heard is through demonstrations.  There is no other 
way” (as quoted in Gallantine, 2008, p. 22).16   
However, social protest as a tool is no longer effective as it was during the Allende administration.  
In addition to the lack of political will of modern Chilean governments to address indigenous issues, 
the state has successfully reframed Mapuche social protest as extremism and terrorism.  As such, 900 
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 Excerpt from an interview with Iván Carilao, Mapuche leader from the Lafkenche (coastal Chile) community. 
Original Spanish: La única forma de que se han logrado de que alguna manera las comunidades sean 
escuchados es a través de [las] movilizaciones, no existe otra en la actualidad. 
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the state is able to employ force and other policies such as the anti-terrorism law against the 
Mapuche without ‘moral recoil’ from the Chilean public (Richards, 2010, p. 77).  Recent years have 
seen Chilean police responses grow increasingly harsher, including “heavily armed community 
presences, helicopter overflights, house searches and even lethal force” (Minority Rights Group 
International, 2011, p. 105).   
Local & National Strategies with International Ripples 
However, one local and national strategy within the realm of social protest has had promising effects 
for advancing the Mapuche cause: hunger strikes.  In 2003, activist Patricia Troncoso Robles (an 
activist for the Mapuche though not herself ethnically Mapuche) initiated a hunger strike while in 
preventive detention awaiting charges.  Her hunger strike, denouncing the application of the anti-910 
terrorism law and Chile’s policies that criminalized Mapuche social protest, lasted 55 days and 
resulted in her release (Haughney, 2011).  After being arrested a second time and found guilty of 
‘terrorist arson’, she was sentenced to ten years imprisonment.  Patricia Troncoso, along with three 
other imprisoned activists, began another hunger strike demanding the release of Mapuche political 
prisoners, the revision of their case, and the repeal of the anti-terrorism law.  This and other hunger 
strikes by Mapuche ‘political prisoners’ caught the attention of international human rights 
organizations, the United Nations, and the European Parliament which resulted in wide 
condemnation of Chile and Bachelet.  The following is a sample of the international outreach 
towards Mapuche hunger strikes: 
(22 July, 2010) The Association of American  Jurists,  nongovernmental  organization in 920 
consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council:  “The declaration of the 
Mapuche prisoners on hunger strike is  based on the legitimate demands for objective and  
impartial  justice, for the right on a due process, and especially for the no application of the 
Antiterrorist Law.” 
(29 July, 2010) Joe Higgins, member of the European Parliament, “I’m conscious about the 
repression the Mapuche people suffer in Chile, I visited Chile in 2008 and expressed my 
support to Elena Varela, persecuted for making a documentary about the Mapuche people.” 
(17 August, 2010) Adolfo Esquivel, Recipient of Nobel Peace Prize: “I’m surprised that today, 
after so many years of democracy in your country, a law created during military dictatorship, 
is still in use.  The Anti-terrorism Law condemns Mapuche as if they were subversives, while 930 
they are only defending their rights.” 
(23 August, 2010) Esteban Beltrán, Chairman of Amnesty International Spain: “I don’t know 
any country, except from Chile, where after 20 years of democracy, still exist laws created 
during dictatorship which are used against the Mapuche. Even if these laws would be used 
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against other people, it would be unacceptable as they do not agree with international 
standards.” 
(24 September, 2010) Press Release of Special Rapporteur on the Situation of the Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Mr. James Anaya: “I have 
expressed my deepest concern over this situation and the need to move towards resolving 
the various issues related to the demands of the hunger strike. […]  I urge the Government 940 
to start a dialogue in good faith with the representatives of the Mapuche prisoners as a key 
step in the search for constructive solutions aimed at addressing the concerns and demands 
that originated the hunger strike.” (Observatorio Ciudadano, 2010) 
Hunger strikes by Mapuche prisoners and activists proved to be an effective tactic to delegitimize 
the government’s harsh responses to Mapuche protests because of hunger strikers’ willingness to 
put themselves at risk, symbolizing “the indomitable resistance of the Mapuche movement and to 
challenge the justice of the government’s policy [and] no longer indisputably frame of the actions as 
‘terrorist’” (Haughney, 2011: 11).  Coupled with international pressure, demands made by Mapuche 
hunger strikers in 2010 resulted in changes to the anti-terrorism law.17  While these changes still do 
not bring Chilean law and practices to international standards on judicial rights, it is an important 950 
first step towards recognizing indigenous rights.  The hunger strikes have also brought positive 
attention to the Mapuche movement through a narrative different that the state’s interpretation of 
the Mapuche as terrorists and ultimately rallied the international community around the Mapuche 
and their struggle. 
Chapter Five 
Reaching Out to International Activists  
The international attention garnered from the Mapuche hunger strikes did not represent the only 
time the Mapuche cause was strengthened by allies in the international community.  One of the 
more notable episodes regards the struggle of the Lafkenche (a Mapuche coastal community) 
against a Chilean pulp manufacturer Celulosa Arauco y Constitucion (CELCO).  In the 1990s, CELCO 960 
began construction of a plant in southern Chile which would have dumped effluents into the ocean 
via a pipeline near a small fishing village, Mehuin.  Non-indigenous fishermen and the Lafkenche 
community joined to protest against the plant believing it would reduce their fish stock and 
successfully prevented the pipeline’s construction near Mehiun. Unfortunately, CECLO’s new 
location for the pipeline not only recreated the same environmental problems, chemicals now being 
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 Reform to the anti-terrorism law removed a section of Article 1 which presumes the defendant has 
‘terroristic’ intent which trumped the presumption of innocence (Observatorio Ciudadano, 2010). 
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fed into a nature sanctuary  began to severely damage one of the largest populations of rare black-
necked swans in South America in 2005 (Kiel, 2011, p. 68).  At this point, local activists reached out 
to international actors for assistance.  Their search for influential voices led them to members of 
European Parliament, especially because of a free trade agreement between Chile and the EU which 
included provisions for environmental protection (Kiel, 2011, p. 68).  Riding on the disappearance of 970 
swans that were “so emblematic of innocent victims” (Haughney, 2012: 11), many environmental 
groups were also invited which helped spark demonstrations, new impact studies, and a temporary 
court-ordered shut down.  The international pressure, especially from the European Commission, 
ultimately drove CELCO to change its plans regarding the waste pipeline, especially after a newly 
founded national environmental commission fined CELCO for illegally dumping waste (Kiel, 2011, p. 
89).    
The success in hindering CELCO’s construction of the waste pipeline can be accredited to the 
presence of international actors who were invited to participate via frameworks that were easily 
accessible to a broader audience (environmental framework in this case).  These international actors 
additionally offered their organizational capacity to increase mobilization of local actors, such as the 980 
Mapuche.  Without these influential transnational organizations, experienced in dealing with 
powerful actors, such as state governments, local inexperienced actors can often lose cohesion.  
When the international campaign against CELCO’s pipeline near the nature reserve ended, CELCO 
was able to take advantage of the local Mapuche and fishermen communities by splitting them 
through offering individual financial settlements (Haughney, 2011, p. 11).   
Accountability through International Forums  
As attention to indigenous rights grows, Chile is put under increased scrutiny to conform to 
international indigenous rights standards.  While the ratification of ILO 169 may have been 
interpreted as non-binding with regards the Chilean constitution, its requirement to submit a report 
detailing their implementation of ILO 169 provisions remained clear (the first report is due one year 990 
after ratification and then repeats every five years unless additional information is requested of the 
state).  In 2010, the first state report detailed the changes to Chilean law made to give effect to each 
of the Convention’s provisions.  However, noting the Chilean government’s attitude towards the 
prevalence of national law over international human rights treaties,  
“The main deficit of the official report would be avoiding the Convention’s application in 
virtue of the pretense that the [1993] Indigenous Law already complies with it.  Such 
position is absurd, especially considering the 17-year long path that was necessary in order 
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to ratify the Convention, and the controls of constitutionality requested [of] it [on] two 
occasions” (Perricone, 2011: 164). 
The Chilean government is therefore in the difficult position of justifying its policies not only to the 1000 
ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (henceforth, ILO 
Committee) reviewing its implementation, but also to the normative community that subscribes to 
the values enshrined by the ILO 169.  As the ILO Committee reviewed the state’s report, it noted 
several contradictions between the intent of indigenous laws and their capacity.  For example, while 
Chilean national law upholds the indigenous communities’ right to free, informed and prior consent 
as required by ILO 169, the committee noted that other legal decrees “appear to leave the decision 
to the administrative bodies to determine whether it is appropriate to start a consultation or 
participation process,” and “appears to limit consultations to the initial formulation of legislation” 
(Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 2010, pp. 2-3).   
Disparity between Legal Obligations and Practices towards the Mapuche  1010 
A similar process takes place within United Nations human rights mechanisms that Chile has 
subscribed itself to via the ratification of several international human rights conventions.  The 
following are several conventions which Chile has ratified: 
Name Signature Accession 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
1966 1971 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1969 1972 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1969 1972 
International Convention on the Rights of the Chile 1990 1990 
International Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
1987 1988 
Table One  
While none of these treaties are specific to indigenous rights, they protect thematic rights which are 
at the core of indigenous rights.  For example, Article 1.4 in the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination which calls for special consideration for a racial or 
ethnic group in order for them to attain an equal enjoyment of all human rights is often used to call 
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on the Chilean government to legally recognize indigenous peoples.18  The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ Article 15.2 on the state party’s obligation to ensure all the 1020 
realization and development of a cultural life for all peoples is often used in reference to Chile’s 
obligation protect the Mapuche’s accessibility to their ancestral lands, especially for cultural 
purposes, and the dissemination of their language, customs, etc.19  For more specific complaints, 
such as practices in the anti-terrorism law which has been applied against Mapuche defendants, 
Article 14.3.e of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can be used to demonstrate 
Chile’s requirement to protect the right “to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him 
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions 
as witnesses against him” (United Nations General Assembly, 1966).   
In recent years, Mapuche activists have been partnering with transnational human rights 
organizations in participating in the review processes of the human rights treaty bodies subscribed 1030 
to by the Chilean state.  As a result, representatives from Mapuche communities are able to bring 
their concerns directly to respective committees for each treaty body as well as to the attention of 
Chilean officials who attend review sessions as part of an official delegation.  Where Mapuche 
activists may be politically blocked from addressing government officials; ministers, directors, 
secretaries, and other politicians are present and often in the same room with Mapuche activists 
during review sessions.  Organizations such as Amnesty International and the International 
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) have participated with local and national Mapuche activist 
groups not only to submit detailed and authoritative reports, but also to prepare oral interventions 
which are followed by direct discussions and lobbying with treaty body committee members.  The 
final outcome of this work are the concluding observations which human rights treaty body 1040 
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 Article 1.4 says, “Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain 
racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such 
groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be 
deemed racial discrimination […]” (United Nations General Assembly, 1965).  The CERD Committee’s official 
recommendation regarding its application to indigenous peoples recognizes that “the recognition of some and 
the refusal to recognize others, may give rise to differing treatment for various groups within a country’s 
population” (United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1997)  
19
 Article 15.2 says, “The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion 
of science and culture” (United Nations General Assembly, 1966).  General comments from the CESCR 
Committee on this article explicitly note that this is a collective right, especially for indigenous peoples, and its 
implementation should agree with principles in the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
and ILO Convention 169 (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2009). 
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committees issue at the end of each review.  While not legally-binding, concluding observations have 
often demonstrated the validity of Mapuche grievances in light of legally-binding treaties. 20   
However, because United Nations treaty bodies have no means of enforcement and can do little 
more than condemn the Chilean government, many fairly criticize that they are an unsuccessful 
vehicle for change.  Yet highlighting the Chilean government’s accountability to Mapuche’s 
indigenous rights at the international level remains crucial, other they “leave with clean hands”.21  
The benefit of these review mechanisms, despite their lack of teeth, lies in publicly revealing a state 
as an “example of bad practice in the international arena” (Perricone, 2010, p. 170). 
Raising International Awareness of Human Rights Violations 
The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is another mechanism which can highlight Chile’s accountability 1050 
to international human rights standards.  Rather than working with legally-binding treaties, Chile’s 
international peers participate in a process in order to highlight needed areas of improvement for 
Chile within a broader human rights mandate.  As all other United Nations members are able to 
‘cross-examine’ Chile and provide recommendations, this provides an opportunity for Mapuche 
activists and partnered transnational human rights organizations to lobby country permanent 
missions who send representatives to the UPR so that questions directed to the Chilean delegation 
will be on indigenous rights issues.  For example, during Chile’s first UPR in 2009, the United 
Kingdom submitted the following questions: 
 What steps is Chile taking to address the discrimination faced by indigenous children in 
accessing healthcare and education? Has the bilingual intercultural program for indigenous 1060 
people been expanded? 
 In line with the 2004 CESCR recommendation what is Chile doing to improve the standards 
of living amongst the indigenous community and people living in rural areas? What steps 
have Chile taken to integrate these people into society? 
 In line with the ILO Committee of Experts findings in 2007 what is Chile doing to improve 
access to education for indigenous people, refugees and children living on poverty and rural 
areas? (Office of the High Commissionerfor Human Rights, 2009) 
Ultimately, twenty-five different states provided thirty distinct recommendations to Chile regarding 
indigenous peoples.  Though UPR has no enforcement mechanisms, Chile as the State-Under-Review, 
pledged to implement all approved recommendations regarding indigenous rights.  However, a 1070 
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 For a complete list of electronic submissions and concluding observations addressing indigenous concerns, 
please see ‘B. Mapuche at United Nations Human Rights Treaty Mechanisms’ in the Appendices section. 
21
 Excerpt from meeting ‘La coordinacion en Europa en apoyo al pueblo Mapuche en Chile/Argentina’ on 25 
February 2012, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Original Spanish: Si no hacemos nada, Chile se limpia las manos y 
se va.  
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follow-up mid-term implementation assessment report found that Chile had not fully implemented 
any of the approved recommendations on indigenous peoples (twenty-five recommendations were 
found to be partially implemented, five recommendations were not to be not implemented at all) 
(UPR-Info.org, 2012).  “The disparity between the Chilean government’s positive responses 
regarding implementation and NGOs’ concerns that the human rights situation remains the same 
and in some situations has worsened, highlights the importance of NGO participation within 
international mechanisms” (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, 2012).  Despite the 
lack of implementation during Chile’s first UPR cycle, Mapuche participation within this review has 
been successful in “generating awareness within the Chilean state on the need to comply with 
international human rights” (UPR-Info.org, 2012).  Since the first review for example, the Chilean 1080 
government announced the creation of a Human Rights Under-Secretariat within the Ministry of 
Justice. 
“’We believe the process is helpful’, says Aylwin. ‘It identifies the shortcoming that Chile has 
on human rights. The information emerging from Chile’s UPR can be remarked when making 
specific claims concerning the non fulfillment of international human rights obligations. [The 
UPR] supports the perspective of human rights NGOs on many issues, providing more 
strength to our claims’” (UPR-Info.org, 2012). 
Changes in Chile for Indigenous Rights  
Despite Chile’s position as the “good student, in the messy classroom that is Latin America” 
(Contesse, 2006, p. 131), the state’s relationship with indigenous peoples in Chile eclipses the 1090 
successes otherwise held by this transitional democracy.  Chile’s lack of implementation of 
indigenous rights enshrined in international human rights treaties and mechanisms therefore raises 
questions as to whether unwillingness or incapacity are responsible for failing to apply indigenous 
rights (Perricone, 2010, p. 169).   
As compliance to international indigenous rights does not necessary lead to concrete changes in 
Chilean policies and practices towards the Mapuche, it is difficult to determine international 
activism’s effect.  While Chile has indeed been ‘compliant’ with its international obligations, such as 
those regarding participating in reviews by submitting reports or sending delegations to committee 
sessions, the ideal forms of compliance that can hope to be achieved in this case are “compliance 
with the substantive obligations outlined in treaties, and compliance with the spirit of the treaty” 1100 
(Hathaway, 2002).  While it is clear that the act of ratifying a treaty in and of itself does not equate 
to changes in country practices, it is important to see whether participation within the treaty 
mechanisms can propel changes in country practices.   
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Despite Mapuche activists and transnational human rights organizations successful campaign in 
highlighting persistent negative trends experienced by the Mapuche in Chile (as acknowledged in 
treaty body committees’ concluding observation reports and other UN human rights mechanisms), 
the overall situation has not improved, despite the passing of indigenous legislation.  This lack of 
improvement is highlighted by Chile’s autonomous National Institute of Human Rights, established in 
2010, in a 2011 report that includes concerns about the lack of progress regarding indigenous rights, 
land restitution, the use of force by police during protests, and the continued application of the anti-1110 
terrorism law against indigenous peoples. 
“The Ethical Commission Against Torture’s annual report noted that, as of May [2011], 62 
Mapuche individuals had been jailed, indicted, or convicted for actions that included 
destruction of property, attacks on farms, or confrontations with police.  The Equitas 
Foundation’s Barometer of Politics and Equality report in April [2011] noted that sentences 
for police convicted of crimes against Mapuche were noticeably more lenient than those for 
Mapuche individuals” (United States, 2012, p. 17). 
Other transnational human rights organizations point out that Chilean government officials 
intrusively monitor and harass human rights defenders, such as law firms that defend Mapuche tried 
under the anti-terrorism law.  In late 2010, the Public Prosecutor’s office of the Araucania region 1120 
served a summons against lawyer Karina Riquelme Viveros who worked for such a law firm, 
indicating that she was being investigated for “illegally practicing her profession” for a period in 
2009 where she signed documents as a legal advisor prior to obtaining a legal license (International 
Federation for Human Rights, 2011).  Additionally, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application 
of Conventions and Recommendations’ call for additional scrutiny of Chile’s first review under ILO 
169 in 2010 (meaning that its implementation of the Convention was unsatisfactory) inevitably 
demonstrate Chile’s lack of willingness to comply with international standards on indigenous 
peoples’ rights.   
Chile’s reservations against acknowledging indigenous ‘peoples’ rather than ‘communities’, for 
example, are deeply rooted within national institutions.  The long path to ratifying ILO 169 because 1130 
of its requirement to constitutionally uphold the recognition of indigenous peoples sends a 
“message about the Chilean way” in addressing indigenous peoples living within the state (Perricone, 
2010, p. 173).  Conservative opinions regarding indigenous peoples, which hold great influence at 
the highest judicial levels, continue to insist that the Chilean nation is “one, indivisible, and 
multicultural” while at the same time recognizing indigenous “communities, organizations and 
members – not the peoples per se – were subjects of rights, and insisted that indigenous ways of life 
must not contradict Chilean law” (Richards, 2010, p. 71).  This same judicial culture is also 
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responsible not for ensuring equal protection and application of the rule of law, but rather for 
“ruling by law” by differentiating the application and interpretation of the anti-terrorism law in order 
to pursue these economic policies (Bialostozky, 2007, p. 90).  Finally, the consideration of indigenous 1140 
land rights and its natural resources constitute an obstacle to Chile’s expansion of its neoliberal 
economic model that is based on the exploitation of natural resources.  Assistance in developing and 
protecting indigenous culture (such as promoting bilingual education) also promotes ideals contrary 
to this economic model, such as cutting or eliminating social services.   
Despite the lack of progress regarding the legal recognition of indigenous peoples, the right to 
protect and develop their traditional identity, the protection of ancestral lands and their resources, 
and no end to policies and practices that discriminate against indigenous peoples, international 
strategies to improve the Mapuche’s indigenous rights still can still attract stronger success than 
local and national strategies of social protest or using national or legal institutions.  Because pressure 
from within is therefore unlikely to be successful due to these political blocks, pressure from 1150 
international platforms stand a greater chance at effectiveness.  In 2011, Mapuche activists and their 
partnered transnational human rights organizations lobbied the European Parliament to consider 
the problems faced by indigenous peoples in Chile.  A representative from the International 
Federation for Human Rights mentioned to MEPs in a statement, 
“If you have invited the representatives of Chilean government and they have not showed 
up, it is typical. They do not want to know what is happening.  They do not want to see what 
is happening.  They do not want to hear what is happening.  They do not want to confront 
people from the European Parliament.  It is a shame, because if they had been here [at the 
European Parliament] we would have urged them to revise the antiterrorism law, to change 
the jurisdictional system. We would also urge them to reform the military code, so that the 1160 
military or soldiers who commit crimes could also be brought to civil court.  We know, for 
instance, that 3 Mapuche youngsters have been executed and the soldiers responsible have 
not been punished. Provided that legal conservatism continues to be encouraged at the 
highest judicial levels, there stands little recourse that Mapuche activism from within will 
make any impact” (International Federation for Human Rights, 2011). 
  Social protest strategies are rarely unified and rarely show any ‘new’ characteristics (Contesse, 
2006).22  Eventually, Mapuche local and national strategies of protests against logging companies, 
dams, and infrastructure projects which included occupations, sit-ins, take-overs of public buildings, 
mass marches, road blockades, public communiques and legal actions, (all of which invoke past 
                                                          
22
 Contesse refutes the idea that differences exist between ‘old’ and ‘new’ social movements.  Despite the idea 
that novelty lies in “values, forms of organization, mobilization, action, sociopolitical objectives and cultural 
contents,” old and new movements are the same provided that participants aim to intervene in the process of 
social transformation (2006, pp. 135-136). 
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strategies which were successful during the Allende period) were challenged by government claims 1170 
of needing to defend law and order (Haughney, 2011, p. 4).  Keeping the advancement of the 
neoliberal economic model and corporate interests prioritized, the Chilean government succeeded 
in transforming Mapuche social protest as “violent, ‘terrorist’ organizations threatening the peace of 
society, the investment climate of the region, and the rule of law” (Haughney, 2011, p. 6).  As such, 
this characterization as ‘terrorists’ have opened government justifications of excessive force and 
harsher punishments towards the Mapuche. 
“The construction of the Mapuche as either [conformist to Chilean ideology on neoliberal 
economics] or terrorist is consistent with Robinson’s characterization of the role of 
peripheral neoliberal states as maintaining social order on behalf of capital; if subjects will 
not consent to what the state offers through (neoliberal multicultural) development policies, 1180 
they face direct coercion” (Richards, 2010, pp. 72-73). 
Compared to local and national level social protest, international activism by the Mapuche cannot be 
so easily reconstructed by the Chilean government.  The credibility and authority held by 
international institutions such as the United Nations or the European Parliament, along with 
endorsement from influential transnational human rights organizations provides vehicles for 
Mapuche grievances to be taken seriously.  Once involved, these organizations bring expertise, 
resources, and international attention to issues faced by the Mapuche.  In 2005, several 
transnational organizations sent a legal support team for 16 Mapuche protestors charged under the 
anti-terrorism law.  In 2007, a coalition of regional and international organizations drafted and 
submitted a report detailing violations against Mapuche activists, including confirmed and 1190 
documented cases of police abuse (Carruthers & Rodriguez, 2009, p. 752).   
While it is difficult to ascertain how international activism strategies have directly contributed to 
policy changes leading to an improvement in indigenous rights, it provides stronger prospects for 
addressing issues faced by the Mapuche. 
Chapter Six 
Summary of Research 
Throughout the history of the Chilean state, the Mapuche people and the Mapuche identity have 
been relegated in favor of the idea of a “monolithic block of national membership,” where all people 
born on Chilean soil are united by a common culture and historic ancestor (Perricone, 2010).  This 
sentiment led to systematic disregard for the Mapuche’s human and indigenous rights, which 1200 
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resulted in the confiscation of their ancestral lands, ultimately threatening the Mapuche identity.  
Their political influence during Allende’s Marxist administration in 1970 strengthened the idea of the 
Mapuche as masters of their destiny, especially through local and national strategies of social 
protest and literally taking back their lands.  Pinochet’s dictatorship from 1973 to 1990 not only 
reversed Mapuche land gains, but introduced the neoliberal economic model that further eroded 
Mapuche culture in favor of private enterprises.  Following a series of partnerships forged towards 
the end of Pinochet’s regime, the Mapuche placed much hope in a newly democratic Chile which 
promised respect for indigenous rights.  Unfortunately, despite the adoption of several ‘face-saving’ 
laws and policies intended to protect indigenous rights, re-democratized Chile continued the 
neoliberal economic model to the detriment of the Mapuche.  As national institutions and legal 1210 
processes continued to favor resource exploitation on Mapuche lands despite contradicting 
legislation requiring their participation in decision-making processes affecting them, the Mapuche 
reemployed local and national social protest campaigns.   
In response, the Chilean government utilized a Pinochet-era anti-terrorism law against Mapuche 
activists that in addition to eroding the civil and political rights of Mapuche defendants, also 
promotes the advancement of economic policy interests (Bialostozky, 2007, p. 85).  Despite being 
typecast as terrorists to justify subjection to harsher security responses, once the Mapuche were 
able to legitimize their grievances through the credibility of transnational human rights organizations 
via international platforms, Chile became exposed to increasing levels of external pressure to change 
its policies and practices towards indigenous peoples.  While concrete changes regarding the 1220 
constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples, assistance in protecting the traditional Mapuche 
identity, indigenous land and its resources, and securing an end to discriminatory policies that target 
the Mapuche for excessive force and criminalize their protest are not yet realized, political 
unwillingness on part of the Chilean government prevents the effectiveness of local or national 
strategies.   
Conclusions 
Chile’s shift to democracy surprisingly has not resulted in an improved relationship with the 
indigenous peoples within its borders.  Long-awaited developments in indigenous rights are met 
with cynicism and remarks of “more of the same”23 as Mapuche communities believe that the 
Chilean government only wants to “smooth over relations with the indigenous movement with views 1230 
                                                          
23
 Original Spanish: Mas de lo mismo. 
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that we do not share” (as quoted in Gallantine, 2008, pp. 26-27).24  President Piñera’s recent remark 
on indigenous culture as a “legitimate source of pride for the Chilean nation,” rather than “thinking 
about [it] as a threat or a problem,” contrasts sharply with the continued application of the anti-
terrorism law on Mapuche activists who say they are struggling to preserve their distinct indigenous 
culture and identity (Green, 2012).  Affected communities’ concerns continue to take a second seat 
to corporate profits, whereas Mapuche notions of wealth are not measured by money, but by “well-
being, reciprocity, and mutual aid” and the balanced relationship man has with nature (Iñiguez, 
2008).  This is not to say that indigenous peoples in Chile are opposed to development and the 
positive growth of the state.  The main point of contention for the Mapuche and all indigenous 
peoples in Chile is the uneven development which has resulted in increased poverty for indigenous 1240 
communities while transnational corporations proper by exploiting resources on ancestral lands.  
This prosperity has come with the additional cost of environmentally damaging culturally important 
lands, displacing and breaking up communities, and persistent threats and assaults on indigenous 
leaders and organizations supporting them (Chihuailaf, 2011). 
The question still remains as to what will truly move Chile to respect indigenous rights.  Mapuche 
strategies of local and national social protest movements are unlikely to yield improvements in the 
implementation of indigenous rights while Chilean institutions remain unwilling to cooperate despite 
their general mandate to do so (Perricone, 2010, p. 176).  International mechanisms that offer 
condemnation or the imposition of moral obligations in lieu of enforcement mechanisms carry 
mostly symbolic meaning.  Yet as Chile strives to move forward, especially as a leader in Latin 1250 
America, even symbolically failing to meet international standards will have negative consequences.  
Chileans have recently seen their democratic freedoms challenged (such as harsh police responses 
to mass student protests for educational reform) and have expressed their high levels of discontent 
with recent administrations.  Piñera’s approval ratings have reached its lowest in April 2012 at 
twenty-six percent (Ulmer, 2012) while opposition Concertación’s approval ratings were recently as 
low as nineteen percent (Daugherty, 2012).  As long as Mapuche activists and the international 
community are able to amass stronger support, Chile can be pushed to listen to indigenous concerns 
which may provide environmentally sustainable with Chilean nature and improve the Chilean 
democratic model to be one devoid of discrimination, exclusion and inequality towards indigenous 
peoples.   1260 
                                                          
24
 Original Spanish: […] blanquear la relacion con el movimiento indigena con anuncios que no compartimos. 
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Appendices 
A. Law 19.253 
(Article 1) Recognition that land is vital for indigenous communities’ existence and culture, 
and as such requires the state and society to protect indigenous lands by ensuring its 
adequate exploitation, ecological balance, and promoting its expansion; 
(Article 12) Identification of indigenous lands as those having been legally acknowledged as 
such by the state; the inclusion of their historic occupants in a new register of lands; and the 
historic occupants’ continued recognition as indigenous into the future;  
(Article 13) Legal protection of indigenous lands from being seized, sold, taxed, or acquired 
by non-indigenous people in the context of national interests;  1440 
(Article 15) Limits on the renting out of indigenous lands (communally owned lands may not 
be rented out and individually-held indigenous land may be rented out for a maximum 
period of five years); Provisions for exchanging indigenous land for other non-indigenous 
land provided they are of similar value and authorized by CONADI; 
(Article 16) Mandatory judicial processes and a majority agreement of all stakeholders 
before dividing indigenous lands; 
(Article 17) Protection against automatic division of indigenous lands in the event of 
ownership secession or death; 
(Article 20) The foundation of a land and water fund to be maintained by CONADI for (a) 
providing subsidies to acquire land for indigenous communities in need, (b) creating financial 1450 
51 
 
mechanisms to solve land conflicts, especially regarding adherence to legal standards, (c) 
financing the constitution, regulation, or purchase of water rights or projects to that end; 
(Article 21) Financial support for the aforementioned fund via existing legal mechanisms and 
donations; 
(Article 23) Funding to assist the development of indigenous communities and individuals for 
the purposes of (a) financing property improvements, legal restitutions, and legal fees 
resulting from litigations regarding in the use, ownership, or administration of indigenous 
lands, (b) establishing credit lines to fund initiatives that move away from sharecropping, (c) 
financing projects for the preservation or restoration of land quality, and (d) purchasing 
fishing licensing authorizations and relevant equipment for its sustainable expansion 1460 
(Ministerio de Planificacion y Cooperacion, 1993). 
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B. Mapuche at United Nations Human Rights Treaty Mechanisms 
The following table is created based on electronic resources available on the websites of each respective treaty body.   
 
Treaty Body Year Session Stakeholder 
Submissions 
mentioning indigenous 
rights/Mapuche 
Concluding Observation mentioning indigenous rights/Mapuche 
International 
Convention 
on the 
Elimination of 
all Forms of 
Racial 
Discrimination 
1999 55th  Alternative Reports 
not digitally available 
“10. The Committee expresses its concern at the absence of specific legislation to 
enforce some of the provisions of the Convention.  The Committee, taking note that the 
1993 Indigenous Act contains a specific article declaring intentional discrimination 
against indigenous persons an offence punishable by law, and that the National Security 
Act prohibits fascist organizations, recalls the proposals for reform of the Constitution 
and the Penal Code, but remains concerned about the current absence of a 
comprehensive legislation in full accordance with articles 2, paragraph 1 (d) and 4, of the 
Convention.” 
“11. The Committee is concerned about land disputes which occurred during the period 
under examination between the Mapuche population and national and multinational 
private companies, resulting in tension, violence, clashes with law enforcement officials 
and, allegedly led to arbitrary arrests of members of the indigenous population.” 
“13. The Committee commends the State party for having recognized its part in the 
discrimination experienced by the indigenous population, recalls its general 
recommendation XXIII and requests that the State party consider the issue of a formal 
apology, as well as ways to ensure compensation to all those concerned, a policy which, 
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inter alia, will significantly contribute to the process of reconciliation in the society as a 
whole.” 
“14. As part of the ongoing legislation reform process, the Committee recommends that 
the Constitution be amended to incorporate a prohibition of racial discrimination and 
that the scope of the Indigenous Act be extended to cover discrimination in effect in 
accordance with article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention.” 
“16. The Committee recommends that the State party use all effective means to raise the 
awareness of its people about the rights of indigenous peoples and national or ethnic 
minorities. It encourages the State party to continue to provide instruction on human 
rights standards in schools and organize training programs for, in particular, law 
enforcement officials, in the light of general recommendation XIII.” 
“17. In its forthcoming report, the State party should include detailed information 
relating to the following: the work and activities of the Indigenous Development 
Corporation; the system of land distribution; the judicial system in place for the 
indigenous population; the situation of migrant workers, the implementation of articles 4 
and 5 of the Convention and, ongoing legislative reforms.” (CERD/C/304/Add.81) 
International 
Covenant on 
Civil and 
Political 
Rights 
1999 65th  Alternative Reports 
not digitally available 
“22. The Committee takes note of the various legislative and administrative measures 
taken to respect and ensure the rights of persons belonging to indigenous communities 
in Chile to enjoy their own culture. Nevertheless, the Committee is concerned by 
hydroelectric and other development projects that might affect the way of life and the 
rights of persons belonging to the Mapuche and other indigenous communities. 
Relocation and compensation may not be appropriate in order to comply with article 27 
of the Covenant.   
Therefore: When planning actions that affect members of indigenous communities, the 
State party must pay primary attention to the sustainability of the indigenous culture and 
54 
 
way of life and to the participation of members of indigenous communities in decisions 
that affect them.” (CCPR/C/79/Add.104) 
International 
Convention 
on the Rights 
of the Child 
2002 29th  Alternative Reports 
not digitally available 
“18. The Committee, while acknowledging that there have been efforts to disseminate 
the Convention during the process for the development of regional plans for children and 
to train professionals working with and for children in line with its previous 
recommendation (ibid, para. 18), nevertheless expresses its concern that these measures 
need to be strengthened, in particular in rural areas and among indigenous children.” 
“19.  The Committee recommends that the State party: (a) Increase its efforts to 
translate informative material into the main indigenous languages and disseminate it; (b) 
Develop more creative methods to promote the Convention, including through 
audiovisual aids such as picture books and posters, in particular at local level, and 
through media; (c) Continue and strengthen its efforts to provide adequate and 
systematic training and/or sensitization on children’s rights of professional groups 
working with and for children, such as judges, lawyers, law enforcement and health 
personnel, teachers and school administrators; (d) Debate and discuss the principles and 
provisions of the Convention with a view to integrating them into the curricula at all 
levels of the educational system; and (e) Seek technical assistance from, among others, 
UNICEF, UNESCO and OHCHR.” 
“26. The Committee, while noting the development of the National Plan to Overcome 
Discrimination in Chile 2001-2006, is concerned that the principle of non-discrimination 
is not fully implemented for children belonging to indigenous groups, poor children, girls, 
children with disabilities and children living in rural areas, especially with regard to their 
access to adequate health care and educational facilities.” 
“27.  The Committee recommends that the State party: (a) Monitor the situation of 
children, in particular those belonging to the above-mentioned vulnerable groups, who 
are exposed to discrimination; and (b) Develop, on the basis of the results of this 
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monitoring, comprehensive strategies containing specific and well-targeted actions 
aimed at eliminating all forms of discrimination, including racial and xenophobic 
discrimination against indigenous children, and implement the National Plan to 
Overcome Discrimination in Chile 2001-2006.” 
“28. The Committee requests that specific information be included in the next periodic 
report on the measures and programs relevant to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child undertaken by the State party to follow up on the Declaration and Program of 
Action adopted at the 2001 World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, and taking account of General Comment No. 1 on 
article 29 (1) of the Convention (aims of education).” 
“39. While noting the decrease in the infant and child mortality rates and the reform 
process which has been under way since the early 1990s, the Committee is nevertheless 
concerned at the great disparities existing within these rates, in particular with regard to 
indigenous children, those living in rural areas, those with a lower socio-economical 
origin and those with a mother with a low level of education. It further notes that 
maternal mortality rates may not reflect actual cases related to complications resulting 
from illegal abortions, in particular those affecting pregnant adolescents.” 
“40.  The Committee recommends that the State party: (a) Allocate appropriate 
resources and develop comprehensive policies and programs to improve the health 
situation of all children without discrimination, in particular by focusing more on primary 
health care and decentralizing the health-care system; (b) In order to prevent child 
mortality and morbidity and lower the maternal mortality rate, provide adequate 
antenatal and postnatal health-care services and develop campaigns to inform parents 
about basic child health and nutrition, the advantages of breastfeeding, hygiene and 
environmental sanitation, family planning and reproductive health, especially in rural 
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areas.” 
“45. The Committee, while noting the increase in the school attendance rate, expresses 
its concern at the difficult access to education, high drop-out and repetition rates which 
affect in particular indigenous children, poor children and the ones living in rural areas; 
the low enrolment rate for pre-school education; the low rate of children reaching 
secondary education and the treatment of children with behavioral problems. It further 
notes with concern the important number of pregnant children who are excluded from 
school and that government measures to avoid this situation are not implemented, 
especially in private schools.” 
“46.  In light of articles 28 and 29 of the Convention, the Committee recommends that 
the State party: (a) Ensure regular attendance at school and the reduction of drop-out 
rates, especially with regard to indigenous children; (b) Develop appropriate measures to 
deal with children with behavioral problems without resorting to expulsion from school; 
(c) Ensure that measures are effectively implemented in order for pregnant girls to 
continue attending school both during and after their pregnancy; (d) Improve the quality 
of education in order to achieve the goals mentioned in article 29 (1), in line with the 
Committee’s General Comments No. 1 on the aims of education.” (CRC/C/15/Add.173) 
 
 
 
International 
Covenant on 
Economic, 
Social and 
2004 33rd  Alternative Reports 
not digitally available 
“13. The Committee notes with concern the lack of constitutional recognition of 
indigenous peoples in the State party and that indigenous peoples, despite the existence 
of various programs and policies to improve their situation, remain disadvantaged in the 
enjoyment of their rights guaranteed by the Covenant. It also regrets that the State party 
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Cultural 
Rights 
has not ratified ILO Convention No. 169 (1989) concerning indigenous and tribal peoples, 
and that unsettled claims over indigenous lands and national resources remain a source 
of conflict and confrontation.” 
“14. The Committee is deeply concerned about the application of special laws, such as 
the Law of State Security (No. 12.927) and the anti-terrorism law (No. 18.314), in the 
context of the current tensions over the ancestral lands in the Mapuche areas.” 
“33. The Committee recommends that the State party include recognition of its 
indigenous peoples in the Constitution, ratify ILO Convention No. 169, and continue to 
strengthen its efforts to ensure the effective enjoyment by indigenous people of their 
economic, social and cultural rights.” 
“34.  The Committee recommends that the State party fully take into consideration the 
recommendations made by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people (E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.3) on the 
implementation of the New Deal Policy 2004-2010, namely that the Land Fund be 
substantially increased; that efforts to recover indigenous lands be strengthened, 
especially in Mapuche areas; and conditions of rural indigenous people be improved, 
especially in the health and educational sectors.” 
“35. The Committee recommends that the State party not apply special laws, such as the 
Law of State Security (No. 12.927) and the anti-terrorism law (No. 18.314), to acts related 
to the social struggle for land and legitimate indigenous complaints.” 
“50. The Committee recommends that the State party continue to strengthen its efforts 
to reduce poverty, especially among indigenous peoples, and to integrate economic, 
social and cultural rights in all its poverty alleviation programs. In this regard, it refers the 
State party to the Committee’s statement on poverty, adopted on 4 May 2001. It also 
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recommends that the State party ensure that adequate resources are allocated towards 
meeting the goals and targets set under the Chile Solidarity (Chile Solidario) and the Chile 
Neighborhood (Chile-barrio) programs.” (E/C.12/1/Add.105) 
International 
Covenant on 
Civil and 
Political 
Rights 
2007 89th  ● Comité de América 
Latina y el Caribe 
para la Defensa de los 
Derechos de la Mujer 
● International 
Federation for 
Human Rights (“The 
Other Chilean 
Transition: Rights of 
the Mapuche People, 
Politics of Criminal 
Law and Social 
Protest in a 
Democratic State”) 
● International 
Federation for 
Human Rights 
(“Possibilities for 
Political Changes 
Regarding Indigenous 
Peoples”) 
● International 
“7. The Committee is concerned about the definition of terrorism contained in the 
Counter-Terrorism Act No. 18.314, which may be excessively broad. It is also concerned 
that this definition has allowed charges of terrorism to be brought against members of 
the Mapuche community in connection with protests or demands for protection of their 
land rights. The Committee also notes that the procedural guarantees set out in article 
14 of the Covenant have been restricted by the application of this Act (articles 2, 14 and 
27 of the Covenant).  
The State party should adopt a narrower definition of crimes of terrorism, so as to 
ensure that it is not applied to individuals for political, religious or ideological reasons. 
Such a definition should be limited to offences which can justifiably be equated with 
terrorism and its serious consequences, and must ensure that the procedural guarantees 
established in the Covenant are upheld.” 
“19. While it notes the intention expressed by the State party to give constitutional 
recognition to indigenous peoples, the Committee is concerned about the variety of 
reports consistently indicating that some claims by indigenous peoples, the Mapuche in 
particular, have not been met, and about the slow progress made in demarcating 
indigenous lands, which has caused social tensions. It is dismayed to learn that “ancestral 
lands” are still threatened by forestry expansion and megaprojects in infrastructure and 
energy (arts. 1 and 27).  
The State party should: (a) Make every possible effort to ensure that its negotiations with 
indigenous communities lead to a solution that respects the land rights of these 
communities in accordance with article 1, paragraph 2, and article 27, of the Covenant. 
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Federation for 
Human Rights & 
Corporacion de 
Promocion y Defensa 
de los Derechos del 
Pueblo 
The State party should expedite procedures to recognize such ancestral lands; (b) Amend 
Act No. 18.314 to bring it into line with article 27 of the Covenant, and revise any sectoral 
legislation that may contravene the rights spelled out in the Covenant; (c) Consult 
indigenous communities before granting licenses for the economic exploitation of 
disputed lands, and guarantee that in no case will exploitation violate the rights 
recognized in the Covenant.” (CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5) 
International 
Convention 
on the Rights 
of the Chile 
2007 44th  Alternative Reports 
not digitally available 
“16. The Committee welcomes the increased allocation for social expenditure, in 
particular in the areas of education and health, however remains concerned that unequal 
distribution of State funds continues to have a negative impact on the well-being of 
children, in particular affecting those from more vulnerable sectors of society, such as 
indigenous peoples and female headed households.” 
“54.The Committee recommends that the State party continue and provide further 
resources for the AUGE health system and enhance the access to medical services in 
rural areas, among low-income families and indigenous peoples. The Committee 
recommends that the State party increase and strengthen strategies to promote the use 
of indigenous traditional medicine. Finally the Committee recommends the State party to 
take necessary measures to reduce and prevent the incidence of obesity among 
children.” 
“61. The Committee welcomes the increase in the enrolment at all levels in the 
educational system, the considerable budget allocations for education and that free 
education during twelve years in school is enshrined as a constitutional right since 2003. 
The Committee also welcomes the priority given to education in the preschool years. The 
Committee recognizes the measures taken to improve the quality of education in order 
to prepare children for their role in a productive and democratic society and notes the 
affirmative action undertaken to improve equal access to education, however it is 
concerned that access for children belonging to vulnerable groups, such as indigenous 
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peoples, refugees and children living in poverty and rural areas is still inadequate.” 
“62. The Committee recommends that the State party: (a) Continue to increase budget 
allocations to the educational sector; (b) Focus on an overall improvement in the quality 
of education provided, in particular in rural areas; (c) Ensure the expansion of the 
bilingual intercultural program for indigenous peoples and maintain consultations with 
indigenous communities in order to evaluate the program; (d) Compile statistics 
disaggregated by urban/rural areas, ethnicity and sex in order to monitor the impact of 
anti-discrimination measures; (e) Invest further resources in incorporating human rights 
education in school curricula.” 
“73. The Committee regrets that the Constitution still does not contain specific 
provisions recognizing indigenous peoples and their rights. The Committee is concerned 
over the high level of correlation between poverty and indigenous origins and the de 
facto discrimination indigenous children continue to face, in particular in the areas of 
education and health. The Committee welcomes the positive steps taken to establish a 
bilingual education program, however it notes that the coverage and resources are 
limited and that dropout rates remain high. The Committee is concerned over reports 
that indigenous youth have been victims of police brutality. Finally, the Committee 
regrets the lack of detailed information on indigenous children in the State party report.” 
“74. The Committee recommends the State party; (a) Incorporate recognition of 
indigenous peoples and their rights in the Constitution; (b) Ratify ILO Convention 169 on 
indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries; (c) Take affirmative measures to 
ensure that indigenous children gain de facto enjoyment of their rights, in particular in 
the area of education and health; (d) Ensure that indigenous youth are not victims of 
police brutality and take both preventive and corrective action when abuse is suspected; 
(e) Take due account of the recommendations adopted by the Committee after its day of 
general discussion in September 2003 on the rights of indigenous children and pay 
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particular attention to the recommendations presented in the report of the 2003 mission 
to Chile of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous people (E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.3); (f) Provide further detailed 
information on the implementation of article 30 in the next periodic State party report.” 
(CRC/CHL/CO/3) 
International 
Convention 
on the 
Elimination of 
all Forms of 
Racial 
Discrimination 
2009 75th  ● Amnesty 
International, Centro 
Derechos Humanos, 
Centro Regional de 
Derechos Humanos y 
Justicia de Genero, 
Observatorio 
Ciudadano, 
Wallmapuwen 
● Mesa de Trabajo 
Mapuche sobre 
Derechos Colectivos, 
Autoridades Políticas 
de la Nación 
Mapuche, 
Organización Meli 
Wixan Mapu, Grupo 
de Trabajo por los 
Derechos Colectivos, 
Asociación Mapuche 
Ayun Mapu, Consejo 
“15. The Committee notes with concern that the Counter-Terrorism Act (No. 18.314) has 
been mainly applied to members of the Mapuche people for acts that took place in the 
context of social demands relating to the defense of their rights to their ancestral lands 
(art. 2).  
The Committee recommends that the State party should: (a) reform the Counter-
Terrorism Act (No. 18.314) to ensure that it is applied only to terrorist offences that 
deserve to be treated as such; (b) ensure that the Counter-Terrorism Act is not applied to 
members of the Mapuche community for acts of protest or social demands; and (c) put 
into practice the recommendations made in this regard by the Human Rights Committee 
in 2007 and by the special rapporteurs on the situation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous people, following their visits to Chile in 2003 and 2009. The 
Committee draws the State party’s attention to its general recommendation No. 31 
(2005) on the prevention of racial discrimination in the administration and functioning of 
the criminal justice system (sect. B, para. 5 (e)).” 
“16. While noting the efforts made by the State party to undertake constitutional reform 
in the area of the rights of indigenous peoples, such as the consultations held with 
indigenous people, the Committee is concerned at the slow pace of this process and the 
fact that not all indigenous peoples have been adequately consulted on decisions related 
to issues that affect their rights (arts. 2 and 5).  
The Committee recommends that the State party should: (a) step up its efforts to speed 
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Comunitario 
Melipeuco 
● Red de Acción por 
los Derechos 
Ambientales 
up the process of granting constitutional recognition to the rights of indigenous peoples 
and, to this end, conduct effective consultations with all the indigenous peoples, in 
accordance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and ILO Convention No. 169; (b) take the necessary measures to establish 
a climate of trust conducive to dialogue with indigenous peoples; and (c) take effective 
measures to involve indigenous peoples in the work on a human rights action plan and in 
all areas, including legislative proposals, that might affect their rights.” 
“18. The Committee notes with concern that, as pointed out by the State party, in recent 
years Chile has seen incidents of discrimination against and violent attacks on indigenous 
people and migrants, among others, by totalitarian groups. The Committee is concerned 
that racism, discrimination and xenophobia are not classed as criminal offences in 
Chilean law (art. 4).  
The Committee recommends that the State party should: (a) speed up the adoption of 
the anti-discrimination bill that would make discriminatory acts punishable by law; (b) 
step up its efforts to prevent and combat xenophobia and racial prejudice among the 
various groups in society, and also to promote tolerance among all ethnic groups; and (c) 
present in its next periodic report further information on investigations, indictments and 
sentences related to racially-motivated offences, as well as on compensation obtained by 
the victims of such acts.” 
“19. The Committee notes with concern the accusations of ill-treatment and abuse of 
members of the Mapuche people by the police during police raids and other operations. 
The Committee notes with dismay the death of a young Mapuche man, José Facundo 
Mendoza Collio, on 12 August 2009, as a result of police gunfire (art. 5 (b)).  
The Committee recommends that: (a) the State party should investigate accusations of 
ill-treatment and abuse of indigenous people by some members of the armed forces; and 
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(b) those responsible for such acts should be tried and punished and compensation 
granted to the victims or their families. The Committee also urges the State party to take 
prompt steps to prevent such acts, and in that regard recommends that it should boost 
training for its armed forces in human rights, including the provisions of the Convention.” 
“20. The Committee notes with concern the low level of participation in political life by 
the indigenous peoples and the poor representation of indigenous peoples in parliament 
(art. 5 (c)).  
In the light of its general recommendation No. 23 (1997), section 4 (d), the Committee 
recommends that the State party should  redouble its efforts to ensure full participation 
by indigenous people, especially women, in public affairs, and that it should take 
effective steps to ensure that all indigenous peoples participate in the administration at 
all levels. “ 
“21. The Committee notes the measures taken by the State party to transfer ancestral 
lands to indigenous peoples, but it is concerned about the slow progress made in 
demarcating lands and the lack of a specific mechanism for recognizing the right of 
indigenous peoples to the land and to their natural resources (art. 5 (d) (v)).  
The Committee recommends that the State party should take the necessary measures to 
speed up the restitution of ancestral lands to indigenous peoples and that it should 
establish a specific mechanism for recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples to lands 
and natural resources, in accordance with the  Convention and the other relevant 
international standards. Specifically, the State party should ensure that land-purchasing 
policies conform fully with ILO Convention No. 169 and should consider increasing the 
budget of CONADI so that it is able to carry out its work properly.” 
“22. While noting the measures taken by the State party to regulate investment in 
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indigenous lands and indigenous development areas, the Committee notes with concern 
that indigenous peoples are affected by the exploitation of subsoil resources in their 
traditional lands and that in practice the right of indigenous peoples to be consulted 
before the natural resources of their lands are exploited is not fully respected.  
The Committee urges the State party to hold effective consultations with indigenous 
peoples on all projects related to their ancestral lands and to obtain their consent prior 
to implementation of projects for the extraction of natural resources, in accordance with 
international standards. The Committee draws the State party’s attention to its general 
recommendation No. 23.” 
“23. The Committee reiterates its concern about the situation of the Mapuche 
communities in the Araucanía region affected by activities that are harmful to the 
environment, health and their traditional ways of life, including the establishment of 
waste dumps and plans to set up sewage-treatment plants there (art. 5). 
The Committee urges the State party to spare no effort to develop a specific policy, in 
line with international standards, to deal with the environmental impacts affecting 
indigenous peoples. To this end, the Committee recommends that scientific assessments 
should be carried out regularly. The Committee further recommends that the State party 
should amend its legislation on land, water, mining and other sectors so that it does not 
conflict with the Indigenous Peoples Act (No. 19.253) and ensure that the protection of 
the rights of indigenous peoples prevails over commercial and economic interests. The 
Committee urges the State party to take immediate steps to resolve the issue of the 
waste dumps established in Mapuche communities without their prior consent.” 
“24. The Committee notes the efforts made by the State party to combat poverty. 
However, it is concerned that indigenous peoples, in particular the Mapuche, are among 
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the poorest and most marginalized groups (art. 5 (e)).  
The Committee recommends that the State party should take the necessary steps to 
assure effective protection against discrimination in various areas, particularly in 
employment, housing, health and education. It also calls on the State party to include in 
its next report information on the impact of programs designed to guarantee economic, 
social and cultural rights to the indigenous population, as well as statistics on progress 
made in this regard.” 
“27. While noting the programs implemented by the Department of Diversity and on-
Discrimination, the Committee is concerned about the persistence in the State party of 
prejudices and negative stereotypes that affect, inter alia, indigenous peoples and 
members of minorities, as revealed by surveys carried out by the University of Chile (art. 
7).  
The Committee recommends that the State party should take appropriate steps to 
combat racial prejudice, which may lead to racial discrimination. In the area of 
information, the State party should foster understanding, tolerance and friendship 
among the various racial groups in the State party. The Committee further recommends 
that the State party should reinforce information campaigns and educational programs 
on the Convention and its provisions, as well as strengthen its training activities for police 
and those working within the criminal justice system on the mechanisms and procedures 
provided for in national legislation in the field of racial discrimination.” 
(CERD/C/CHL/CO/15-18) 
International 
Convention 
against 
Torture and 
2009 42nd  ● Amnesty 
International, Centro 
Derechos Humanos, 
Observatorio 
“23. The Committee takes note of the text of the constitutional amendment now 
before Congress which accords recognition to indigenous peoples. The Committee also 
welcomes the establishment of an ombudsman’s office for indigenous peoples 
specializing in criminal matters. Nevertheless, the Committee is concerned by the many 
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Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or 
Degrading 
Treatment or 
Punishment 
Ciudadano, Centro de 
Salud Mental y 
Derechos Humanos, 
Opcion, Centro 
Regional de Derechos 
Humanos y Justicia 
de Genero 
● International 
Federation for 
Human Rights, 
Corporacion de 
Promocion y Defensa 
de los Derechos del 
Pueblo 
reports that it has received regarding the continuing commission of abusive acts by 
police officers against members of indigenous peoples, especially members of the 
Mapuche people. The Committee is particularly concerned by the fact that the victims of 
these acts include women, children and older persons. The Committee also notes with 
concern that the State party has on occasion applied the Counter-Terrorism Act to 
members of indigenous peoples in connection with acts of social protest (art. 16). 
The State party should:  (a) Take all necessary steps to carry out prompt and effective 
investigations into abuses committed against members of indigenous peoples and to 
bring to trial and punish any police officers who commit such abuses;  (b) Provide 
detailed statistics, with breakdowns by age, sex and geographical location, on all 
complaints of acts of torture or ill-treatment committed by law enforcement officers 
against members of indigenous peoples, as well as on the corresponding investigations, 
trials and convictions;  (c) Provide detailed data on the cases involving indigenous 
persons in which the Counter-Terrorism Act has been applied.” (CAT/C/CHL/CO/5) 
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